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Information Systems today rarely are contained within a single user workstation, server, or 
networked environment.   Data can be transparently accessed from any location, and maintained 
across various network infrastructures.  Cloud computing paradigms commoditize the hardware 
and software environments and allow an enterprise to lease computing resources by the hour, 
minute, or number of instances required to complete a processing task.   An access control policy 
mediates access requests between authorized users of an information system and the system’s 
resources.  Access control policies are defined at any given level of abstraction, such as the file, 
directory, system, or network, and can be instantiated in layers of increasing (or decreasing) 
abstraction.  For the system end-user, the functional allocation of security policy to discrete 
system components, or subsystems, may be too complex for comprehension.  In this dissertation, 
the concept of a metapolicy, or policy that governs execution of subordinate security policies, is 
introduced.  From the user’s perspective, the metapolicy provides the rules for system 
governance that are functionally applied across the system’s components for policy enforcement.  
The metapolicy provides a method to communicate updated higher-level policy information to 
all components of a system; it minimizes the overhead associated with access control decisions 
by making access decisions at the highest level possible in the policy hierarchy.  Formal 
definitions of policy often involve mathematical proof, formal logic, or set theoretic notation.   
Such policy definitions may be beyond the capability of a system user who simply wants to 
control information sharing.   For thousands of years, mankind has used narrative and 
storytelling as a way to convey knowledge.  This dissertation discusses how the concepts of 
storytelling can be embodied in computational narrative and used as a top-level requirements 
specification.   The definition of metapolicy is further discussed, as is the relationship between 
the metapolicy and various access control mechanisms. The use of storytelling to derive the 
metapolicy and its applicability to formal requirements definition is discussed.  The author’s 
hypothesis on the use of narrative to explain security policy to the system user is validated 
through the use of a series of survey instruments.  The survey instrument applies either a 
traditional requirements specification language or a brief narrative to describe a security policy 
and asks the subject to interpret the statements.   The results of this research are promising and 
reflect a synthesis of the disciplines of neuroscience, security, and formal methods to present a 
potentially more comprehensible knowledge representation of security policy. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines security (OED, 2012) as: 
 
• the state of being free from danger or threat: the system is designed 
to provide maximum security against toxic spills;  job 
security   
• the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as 
terrorism, theft, or espionage: a matter of national security   
• procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the safety of a 
state or organization: amid tight security the presidents met in 
the Colombian resort   
• the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety: this       
man could give the emotional security she needed 
 
and further defines cybersecurity (OED, 2012) as: 
 
[as noun]: 
the state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic 
data, or the measures taken to achieve this: 
some people have argued that the threat to cybersecurity has been somewhat 
inflated 
 
[as modifier]: 
IT security professionals said that outsourcing would be the biggest 
cybersecurity threat 
 
From these definitions, it becomes evident that a sense of security requires more than just 
a single person:  it requires a person with something that needs security, such as data, and 
a second person who desires to take that sense of security away from an individual by 
stealing the information or otherwise exploiting a vulnerability.    In Medieval Times, 
serfs gained a sense of security by working for lords and living within the walls of their 
castles.   And so it is today, as we seek a sense of security for our data with protective 
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countermeasures such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and virtual private 
networks.   
 Whether we wish to admit it or not, security is a social function (Schaefer, 2009):  
It is about a person, organization, or entity determining which information to share.  
Schaefer further states:  
 Security, at its most basic, requires the ability to differentiate, to 
recognize one object is different from another.   We differentiate objects 
for the many reasons we assign attributes and values.   For survival, for 
example, we place a skull and crossbones on a bottle of poison.  How do 
we differentiate?   One assigns an attribute to an observation as a label 
with meaning.   The label is something reliably, repeatedly measurable, 
using our five senses, perhaps using tools or technology as extensions of 
our senses.   Differentiation may be made by scientific observation and 
objectivity, or by just because, reasoning overridden by subjective feeling 
(Schaefer, 2009, p. 2) (emphasis from original text).  
 
Schell states that labels can be used as a social mechanism for 
understanding the sensitivity of the user’s current context; be it processing the 
reading or the writing of information.  That is, labels provide the user an external 
cue as to the sensitivity of the information when it is addressed in the 
environmental context of who, what, when, where, why, and how (Schell, 2001). 
In this context, a security policy addresses the protection mechanisms 
employed to protect an organization’s assets from potential misuse.  In reality, a 
security policy is a set of clearly articulated rules that specify constraints about 
data usage (Bell D. E., 2005).  The access control policy defines how system users 
interact with the data stored within the system.  
This dissertation explores the use of structured storytelling paradigms to 
extract the security policy for the system consumer.  We begin with a background 
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discussion of security policy and traditional formalism used for policy expression.  
From this foundation, we move to a discussion of secure system design 
techniques based in formalism, and explore the usability constraints associated 
with formal methods.   We present an alternative policy definition strategy:  that 
of storytelling, and describe an experiment to determine the usability of this 
approach. Finally, we present the results of the experiment; discuss its 
implications, and potential areas for further research in this area. 
Historical Background 
Winsborough poses the question of whether policy can be distinguished from 
requirements and states that policy is intentional, in that it provides rules characterizing 
the author’s intentions for system behavior; whereas requirements are not concerned 
about the underlying intentions (Winsborough, 2004).   Winsborough further states that a 
policy is a set of rules that are used to manage and control the state and state transitions 
of one or more managed objects  (p.20)   An individual policy rule is considered an 
intelligent data container;  containing: 
• knowledge and metadata that define the semantics and behavior of the 
policy rule and its effect on the rest of the system. 
• A group of events that can be used to trigger the evaluation of the condition 
clause of a policy rule. 
• A group of conditions aggregated by the policy rule. 
• A group of actions aggregated by the policy rule (p. 20) 
 
Beyond these statements, Winsborough speculates on the feasibility of a single policy 
language, responsible for translating policies into plans of action, composing policies, 
and interpreting policies amongst domains.  Further, such a language would have to 
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address conflict detection and resolution, dependency analysis, and allow translation into 
multiple graphical user interfaces to address the needs of various constituencies (p. 42). 
He concludes with a wish list for policy specification, namely that policy creation 
techniques should be (i) sufficiently expressive of preferences regarding cost v. 
performance, security, risk, and reliability; (ii) sufficiently structured and/or naturally 
suited to human psychology and cognition to keep specification errors to an absolute 
minimum; and (iii) robust to specification errors (p. 43). 
Current generation computer systems are rarely monolithic architectures.   Rather, 
there are user clients, connected to various servers through the Internet, traversing 
routers, switches, and firewalls to fulfill information requests.   In this environment, 
every security policy becomes a meta-policy, and the individual policy rules can be 
decomposed based on their function, forming subordinate policies to address specific 
concerns, for example:  accountability, authentication, contingency, or access control.  
Figure 1 illustrates a representative policy model for an enterprise application (Sherwood, 
Clark, & Lynas, 2008).  
With such a large number of subordinate policies composing a security meta-
policy, authoring a policy becomes an exercise in formal specification to ensure policy 
correctness.  However, the higher the degree of formalism desired, the higher the degree 
of expertise required to generate a policy.   As an example, consider the following: 
Jajodia developed the Authorization Specification Language (ASL) to specify 
various access control policies with stratified clause form logic (Jajodia, 1997).  The 
following are two example rules in ASL: 
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cando (file 1, Customer, +read)  <-    {members of the role customer can read file1} 
cando (file 2, s, +write) <- in (s, Employee) & -^OM (s, Customer) 
 {subjects active in the role “Employee” and Not the role “Customer” may write to file 2} 
 
 
Figure 1 – The many layers of security policy (Sherwood, Clark, & Lynas, 2008). 
An alternate language specification is proposed in LaSCO (Hoagland J.A., 1998), 
where the following graphical structure is used to indicate that a Customer needs to have 
an ID represented by the policy variable $UID included in the access control list of file 1 
in order to have access to it: 
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 In most access control models, access control is defined as a triple consisting of 
the <subject, object, privileges> associated with a given data container, for example, a 
file or a row in a database.  In the early days of computing, much discussion surrounded 
how access control models should be represented in computer systems.  (Schell, 1979) 
developed the notion of multilevel mode of operations, stating: 
In multilevel mode, the computer must internally distinguish multiple levels of 
information sensitivity and user authorization.  Internal Controls of hardware 
and programs must assure that each user has access to only authorized 
information (p. 20).  
Schell further stated: 
The security kernel design is derived directly from a precise specification (i.e. 
mathematical model) of its functions (like a cryptographic algorithm).  This 
mathematical model is a precise formulation of access rules based on user 
attributes (clearance, need-to-know) and information attributes 
(classification). (p. 21).  
By 2001, Schell had a slightly different perspective, stating that users want the 
convenience of being in the same virtual integrity domain as the least mindful and least 
informed among them (Schell, 2001).  He further stated that to counter malicious 
software, systems must be designed and built to have all of the following properties: 
• No exploitable flaws. 
• Enforce security policies on information flow, thereby bounding the damage of 
malicious applications software. 
• Built to be subject to third party inspection and analysis to confirm the protections 
are correct, complete, and do nothing more than advertised. 
 
To summarize, the security model must be a valid representation of the behavior with 
regard to the information protection of the entire system.   The model must include a 
proven security theorem, which establishes that the model’s behavior always complies 
with the security requirements for the policy of interest rather than being a formalization 
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of the mechanism itself.  To illustrate, Schell defined three domains for execution, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Domains for execution reflecting mandatory, discretionary, and application   
                 layer security policies. 
Unfortunately, separate domains do not reflect the security policies of most civil 
government and commercial organizations.    The U.S. Government has a uniform 
classification hierarchy for information, (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and 
Unclassified) which can be represented as a mathematical lattice structure.   Commercial 
organizations usually do not maintain a similar uniform classification hierarchy that is 
recognized and enforced by other organizations, but instead implement access controls 
based upon a user’s role in the organization.  For example:  a user may have a functional 
role (system administrator), an organizational role (manger, IT department), and an 
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administrative role (time card approver).  The concept of Role-based access control 
(RBAC) was introduced by (Ferraiolo, 1995; Schell, 1979), and (Sandhu R. C., 1996) to 
more accurately model the workings of a commercial enterprise.   In RBAC, access 
control is based on a four-element set (user, group, object, privileges).  A user may 
belong to many groups, each with a different privilege set.  In the worst-case model, 
every user has their own group, and there are as many groups to administer as there are 
users.  In (Ferraiolo, 1995) a role is defined and centrally administered within an 
organization.  RBAC as a modeling tool has been accepted as a useful tool that reflects 
both how organizations function and how information access is implemented in most 
commercial applications. 
However, with the flexibility of RBAC, there are some limitations.  In a 
distributed network centric enterprise, it may take several hours to confirm the update of 
an application’s access control roles.    Because several applications may use their own 
security services instead of the centralized security services of the operating system, it 
may be difficult to determine whether an access control policy has been completely 
administered.  In fact, it may well be that RBAC in a distributed enterprise can violate the 
three primary engineering principals of a security reference monitor validation 
mechanism (Schell, 1979, p. 29):  
1. Completeness – that the policy is invoked on every access to data 
2. Isolation – the security mechanism is protected from unauthorized 
modification 
3. Verifiability – the policy must be small and simple for complete test and 
verification. 
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There are times when an event may occur that requires comprehensive pre-
emption or revocation of a security policy.  For example, after September 11, 2001, data 
security policies for U.S. Government web sites were changed (U.S. Government, 2003).  
In these instances, waiting for confirmation that the access control policy has been 
updated throughout the enterprise may not be possible.  (Hosmer, 1991) presented the 
notion of a metapolicy to address instances of arbitration among diverse domains 
implementing disparate security policies.  In her paper, the use of a metapolicy to address 
immediate access control policy changes for an enterprise is presented.  The paper 
discussed how a metapolicy approach differs from the current work on context and 
constraint based access control policies.  It then discussed the problems associated with 
metapolicy creation and administration, including how multiple policies may coexist 
within a domain.   The use of narrative storytelling, and computer-assisted storytelling is 
presented as an alternative method of meta-policy formation.  This technique is examined 
in the context of Risk-Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC), the current state of thought for 
globally distributed security policies. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  The problem of timely 
policy administration is presented.  Next, the barriers and issues associated with the 
coexistence of multiple policies in a single domain are addressed.  A survey of the 
literature addressing the technologies of system design, policy, requirements engineering, 
and computer assisted storytelling is presented.  A metapolicy creation methodology is 
proposed as an experiment and the experimental results are presented. Finally, future 
work on the use of meta-policies for access control is addressed. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
 In the current generation of information systems, security policy enforcement 
mechanisms are dispersed throughout the system architecture as countermeasures to 
specific threats (Henning, 2002).  For example, virus scanning, firewalls, virtual private 
networking (VPN) clients, and intrusion prevention sensors were all created to respond to 
specific threats to information systems.  Figure 3 illustrates this functional architecture.  
In essence, every time a vulnerability is identified, publicized, and exploited, another 
stopgap security countermeasure is created in response to the threat. 
 
Figure 3. Functional security architecture, with countermeasures deployed against 
specific threats.     
 The problem with this approach to security is that it is highly reactive, in that 
system protections are deployed in response to specific threat information.  Ideally, 
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general-purpose security mechanisms such as access control lists exist so that adaptive 
security policies can be defined and deployed in response to a specific threat.   For 
example, an intrusion prevention sensor can be provided an attack signature that allows it 
to identify a new type of vulnerability and neutralize it. 
In addition to being reactive to threats, this type of security policy is not 
particularly useful in an enterprise environment.   Within the context of an enterprise, 
security policies are generally high-level, technology neutral, concern risks, set directions 
and procedures, and define penalties and countermeasures if the policy is transgressed 
(Rees, 2003).  Unfortunately, those grand enterprise access control policies do not 
translate into implementable mechanisms.   Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown between 
implementation capabilities and user access control policy specification.  
 
Figure 4 – Decomposition of policy model representations demonstrates the disconnect 
between implementation and formalism in enterprise models. 
Firewall VPN Accelerator Database Server Router
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 The issue, then, is how to specify a security policy at a high level that has 
significance to the policy users, and can be traced to lower level implementation guidance 
and functional system decomposition activities.    Figure 5 illustrates the concept of a 
security policy specification that accommodates traditional non-ambiguous security 
policy information (user X can only see SECRET Data), contextual information (user X 
can only see SECRET data if in the office) and usage constraints (User X cannot send 
information outside a given domain), as well as more abstract notions such as “share no 
information outside the organization.”  In the ideal world, a security policy can be 
defined as a series of binary grant/deny operations.    In reality, grant/deny operations are 
contingent upon environmental, organizational, and operational constraints, which may 
be defined with varying degrees of specificity.  In the extreme case, security policy could 
be defined as “if a user says share the data, then share the data.”  However, it becomes 
much more difficult to embed this type of constraint within a computer system.  An 
analogous situation would be to “know art when you see it.” 
In the ideal case, a security policy can be decomposed to address various contexts, 
or environments, for its enforcement.  Security policies define acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior for software systems (Schneider, 2000).  For example, a user in a 
remote office may not have the same access rights to information as a user at corporate 
headquarters.  Specification of contextual security information facilitates creation of a 
useful access control policy. 
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Figure 5 - Degrees of specificity that can be applied to security policy. 
 (Burnside & Keromytis, 2007) discuss the concept of enterprise security 
management with global security policies.  Every policy decision is made with near-
global knowledge, and then re-evaluated as the global knowledge changes.   Four major 
types of components are applied: 
 
1. Sensors.  Small programs scattered around the network that generate events 
corresponding to observed network and application behavior. 
2. Events.  Any action performed by an application that may be relevant to some 
policy decision.  Events may be positive or negative. 
3. Policy.  A list of objectives, rules for behavior, requirements and responses, 
whose goal is to ensure the security of the network. 
4. Actuators.   A program, which modifies application behavior after being 
triggered by a policy; the policy enforcement point. 
 
A network, consisting of applications and network links, is observed by the 
sensors, each generating events in response to requests.   Events are evaluated by policy, 
which makes decisions and notifies the actuators to modify application behavior in 
response. 
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DISSERTATION GOAL 
 
The goal of this dissertation `is to determine the feasibility of defining a top-level 
security policy supporting a significant degree of formalism that can accommodate 
verification of completeness and traceability to lower-level functional system 
specifications.  The objective is to define the set of logical security principles that govern 
system behavior, are enforceable throughout the system design process, and are 
comprehensible to the system stakeholders.  The scope of this research is the solicitation 
of these logical security principles in a rigorous and standardized methodology such that 
formalism can be subsequently applied to the policy model.  The system environment 
may not be well defined during early implementation phases or in usage scenarios, 
which, in turn, inhibits the development of effective foundation security measures.  If the 
foundation security mechanisms are not in place early, it may not be practical to apply 
them during later phases without extensive system rework.  An end-user should never 
have to be concerned with the format of an access control list or firewall rule: a general 
statement of access management should be traceable to lower-level implementation 
specific constraints.   These general statements, or metapolicy, provide the overarching 
governance framework for an information system.   
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 Kendall Haven, in Story Proof (Haven, 2007) states:  
 
Mankind has learned to read and write only in the past few hundred years.  
Logical, expository, and argumentative forms first emerged perhaps 5,000 
years ago.   But humans have been telling stories for 100,000 years or 
more.   Evolutionary biologists tell us that 100,000 years of story 
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dominance in human interaction has rewired the human brain to be 
predisposed before birth to think in, make sense in, and create meaning 
from stories (p.24). 
 
Boyd (Boyd, 2009) states “humans are hyper-intelligent and hyper-social animals. 
By integrating intelligence, cooperation, pattern-seeking, alliance making, and beliefs and 
knowledge from other people, stories make us stronger and more effective.” 
Haven further states: 
 
By the beginning of kindergarten, the concepts of story “trouble” 
character, temporal sequencing, cause-and-effect sequencing, and goal are 
well fixed and known.  Given a character and a goal, children will easily 
identify the type of trouble that is most likely to occur and will correctly 
identify that trouble will emerge to block a character from reaching the 
stated goal.   Additionally, they know to search for hints of upcoming 
trouble.  They know what to expect from a story and will adjust their 
perceptions and their interpretations of narrative inputs to find (or create) 
it (p. 25). 
  
To extend further and summarize cognitive science: humans require that events 
make sense, and create or mentally invent what is needed to make sense through cause-
and-effect sequencing, temporal sequencing, centering around a common theme, and 
character analysis.   Bransford and Brown stated,  “the mind imposes structure on the 
information available from experience and interprets (creates meaning for) experience 
through this story structure” (Bransford, 2000). 
The research question posed is simple:  if the human brain is most receptive to the 
narrative, story-like structure, why not apply it to the concept of security policy? Current 
device implementation languages such as Cisco’s Internet Operating System (IOS), 
Linux, or Windows OS demand specific programming language syntax.   This syntactic 
level of complexity is multiplied in a heterogeneous infrastructure of network 
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components, servers, clients, and applications.   Expecting a system developer to 
understand and implement policy consistently within a complex architecture may be 
beyond a programmer’s level of understanding and result in error-ridden implementations 
that are exploitable by malicious users.   
Our hypothesis is that the security policy elements required to implement 
complex security meta-policies can be best expressed as story or narrative elements. 
Through the use of narrative story, security policy can be expressed in the format most 
familiar to mankind, and most commonly used to represent socially acceptable normative 
behavior.  In turn, these narrative elements can be decomposed into sub-policies and 
system requirements such that the policy enforcement mechanisms can be explicitly 
traced back to the specific story elements in the top-level policy statement.   What we 
seek to provide is the linkage from the computational language used to create machine 
instructions to the comprehensible language used to express policy rules in everyday life.    
For example, a parent tells a child to play in the yard, not the street.   A parent 
does not express that as a logical axiom, but the intent is to enforce a boundary on the 
area acceptable for play.   The child comes to understand that boundary through repeated 
statement of the rule, and possibly punishment for disobedience.   The parent intends to 
provide a safe play area for the child, namely, the yard.   The safety of the play area is 
implicit in the rule, and is not logically expressed.   In a computational language, the 
domain of the yard would be defined, and an executable statement would be tested to 
determine if it was within the domain or beyond the domain’s boundaries. 
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RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
This section discusses the various research conducted on access control models 
that is relevant to the concept of metapolicy formulation and implementation. 
In (Hosmer, 1991) the concept of a metapolicy was introduced.  A metapolicy is a 
policy about other policies, the rules and assumptions about the policies, and explicitly 
states the coordination of interaction among policies rather than implicitly leaving such 
coordination to the administrators. (p. 2).  Hosmer’s interpretation was that a metapolicy 
would address how diverse policies could interact across domain boundaries, how data 
could be updated across domains, and how precedence could be determined and 
ambiguity removed.     
Provisions were made for concurrent support of multiple policies to meet multiple 
security goals or the needs of different organizations with their own policy intentions; the 
provision was made for multiple policies.  The constraints on support for multiple 
metapolicies were that each metapolicy had its own: 
• Source or owner, 
• Enforcement authorities, which could be different from the source, and 
• Evolutionary timeframe (Hosmer, 1991, pp. 4-5). 
 
Initially, metapolicies were envisioned as being flexible, potentially layered, 
tamperproof, and providing a controlling representation of the organization, system, or 
security policy they represented.  In (Hosmer, 1993), the concept of a multipolicy 
paradigm was presented.  A key use of multipolicies was for changing circumstances, for 
example when a country moves from peace to war. (p. 1).  The emphasis was on explicit 
statements of interaction that could continuously enforce the multipolicy intersection and 
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be formally specifiable and subject to verification of tamper-resistance, the very 
characteristics Schell presented as desirable for a security kernel architecture. 
 Bell, and LaPadula, (1976) modeled a multilevel security policy that was 
implemented in the Multics operating system.  This model essentially partitioned the 
operating system into N-levels of processing, where processing between levels was 
governed by the Multics security policy.  In (Bell D. , 1994) modeling an instance of a 
“Multipolicy Machine” is presented and 4 levels of abstraction are associated with any 
given security policy (p. 2):  
1. An organization abstraction, written as a narrative, for people to read; 
2. A conceptual abstraction, discussing an organizational policy at the concept level; 
3. An abstract level, describing the design and tracing the conceptual requirements; 
and 
4. An implementation level, describing the design as developed. 
 
Bell further uses requests, decisions, and state-transition decisions to describe the 
computational machine model of a multi-policy system component.     
(Baskerville, 2002) and  (Hafmann & Kuhnhauser, 1999) addressed the concept 
of an information security meta-policy for an organization, and the characteristics of such 
a meta-policy.  Security is considered a facilitating capability, not a hindrance, and there 
is recognition that access control policies change over time.  Meta-policies, in this 
discussion, must possess the characteristic of political simplicity, and be criterion-
oriented:  that is, they must be comprehensible and produce a measurable result. (p. 341).  
In essence, these meta-policies require explicit statements enumerating the subject’s 
accessing data objects, and the rules for access that will be enforced.   
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(Hafmann & Kuhnhauser, 1999) demonstrated that the multi-policy concept could 
be implemented in a Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) in software, with a 
collection of small software security components that were used to enforce policy 
separation and, persistency, mediation, and policy domains.   
Finally, (MacGraw, 2009) defines the concept of Risk Adaptable Access Control 
(RADAC).  In RADAC, the context of the information usage and the potential risk of 
unauthorized disclosure are incorporated into the access control decision.    A conceptual 
architecture for RADAC is illustrated if Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Architecture for Risk Adaptable Access Control (Government, Global 
Information Grid Information Assurance Reference Capabilities Document, 
2004). 
Note the inputs to the Security Risk Measurement and Operational Need Determination 
Functions are included in the access decision.   However, little research has been 
conducted to date on how this information will be gathered or placed in an actionable 
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format.   The use of narrative to solicit this information may present the most viable near-
term solution for data collection and integration into the access decision function.  
BARRIERS AND ISSUES 
This section discusses the barriers and issues associated with security policy 
definition and integration into the requirements and system design process. 
Definition of Context 
 
The dictionary definition of the word “context” is the “circumstances or events 
that form the environment within which something exists or takes place (Oxford English 
Dictionary).  Describing the general context of an application would be an infinite 
problem, as there are always new observations or attributes to incorporate into the 
context.  In (Covington, Srinivasan, Dey, Ahamad, & Abowd, 2001) the environmental 
roles are defined as the security relevant aspects of the environment.  The question then 
becomes, which aspects of the environment are security relevant.  These are contingent 
on the various interpretations of the environment that each application uses for its access 
control decisions.  Covington further emphasizes that environmental roles are used to 
maintain uniformity across a diverse environment. (p. 12).  Further, those devices that 
monitor the environmental conditions, the sensors, must be authenticated and the 
integrity of their data guaranteed, or the environmental policy components could be 
compromised. 
(Strembeck, 2004) states:  “every goal and obstacle can be used to define a 
context condition and can map to a concrete access control service.” (p. 400).  It becomes 
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necessary, then, to have an environmental model in mind prior to exploring a context-
based security policy. 
Conflicting Policies 
 
 (Wang & Livny, 2004) discuss the issue of policy reconciliation in heterogeneous 
environments.    The notion of a reconciliation algorithm is introduced to find a security 
policy that consistently adheres to the security policies of all participating domains (p. 1).   
Wang’s model applies acyclic graph theory to model the security mechanisms employed 
by various environments to provide a framework for policy an analysis.  Further, the use 
of acyclic graph theory exposes commonalities in policy and countermeasures to provide 
an efficient reconciliation method (linear in size v. N-P-complete).   
The computing landscape has matured to the point where basic security 
mechanisms exist in most system architectures today.  That is, there is some 
authentication, access control, and domain separation supported by the majority of 
operating systems; what differs is the degree of robustness and strength supported.   With 
the maturation of the security mechanisms, it becomes more feasible to define a 
structured characterization of a system security environment using policy reconciliation. 
 The Existence of Supporting Modeling Tools and Concepts 
 
(Jaeger, 2001) discusses the concept of safety in access control models.  A safe 
access control model is one in which a given access control will not inadvertently leak 
access rights to unauthorized persons.  Safe models require restrictive security policies, 
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namely policies that apply constant values as constraints, because variable constraint-
based policies are difficult to administer. (p. 158).  Jaeger also applies graph theory to 
design comprehensible security policies. 
(Bertino, Ferrari, & Perlasca, 2001) presents a framework for logical reasoning 
about access control models.  In this framework, access control models are modeled in 
the C-datalog language to develop a common basis for comparison.   
The Existence of More Robust Security Models 
 
In the early history of security technologies, security models reflected either 
mandatory access controls (MAC) or discretionary access controls (DAC) as a security 
mechanism.  More flexible models such as RBAC were nonexistent in the formal sense.  
The last 10 years have brought the concepts of Usage-controlled models (UCON) 
(Sandhu R. , 2004) Type Enforcement, and other security models that provide a more 
granular model of access control interactions. 
For example, in Sandhu’s UCON model, the traditional lattice-based access 
control models are used in conjunction with a policy-based authorization management 
infrastructure.  In the past, access decisions were binary; validated on an as-needed basis, 
with the access maintained for the life of the session.  The UCON model allows access 
rights to change during the life of a session, treating access as a consumable, specifiable 
event that can exist for a single object access or all attempted object access instances 
within a session (p. 1). 
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The Acceptance of Artificial Intelligence Tools to Facilitate Metapolicy Modeling 
 
The existence of artificial intelligence tools that offered data reduction and the 
ability to replicate results consistently has also been a relatively recent development.  
Artificial intelligence techniques were not considered reliable – the results depended 
upon the interpretation of the analysis and of the input data sets.  As a result, the 
technology was dismissed by all but the formal specification community. 
In the mid-1990’s the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) 
instituted a new set of initiatives to improve the information assurance tool environment.  
This initiative led to several developments in data visualization and intrusion detection 
technologies.  It also brought an increased acceptance of artificial intelligence tools and 
techniques to the information assurance community.   
For example, the use of directed acyclic graph theory to model RBAC and RBAC 
constraints lends itself nicely to the use of Bayesian belief networks (Lueger).  In this 
case, a security policy structure can be represented as a graph, and the nodes of the graph 
assigned probabilities commensurate with the potential for policy violation.     
Similarly, (Lin, 2000) uses information tables to represent policy conflict analysis 
among multiple security policies.  The number of policies, and the number of issues that 
can be potentially associated with each policy, lend themselves to the use of information 
tables.  The use of decision tree analysis techniques would potentially accommodate the 
analysis of finer granularity security policies. 
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The Realization that Policy Models are Contextual in Nature but must have a 
Formal Foundation. 
 It is not sufficient to state a security policy without having a degree of formalism 
attached to it.  System consumers usually have no desire to learn or understand the formal 
methods required to generate a sound security system.   As succinctly stated in (Bell, 
2005):  
“The Bell-La Padula Model demonstrated the importance of a clear definition of 
the “security” being addressed.   Without a clear definition, one faces unending 
complaints about “essential” aspects of security being omitted. How can you call 
a system secure if it doesn’t prohibit (or require) N?” 
 
Formal policy foundation mechanisms have not been readily available.    Design 
languages that can address most aspects of a system’s context have only begun emerging 
in the research community.  (Alexander, 2006) describes the use of Rosetta as a system 
level design language, as opposed to a software component level design language.    
Rosetta addresses the systems engineering specialties such as reliability, maintainability, 
and latency.  In such a model, there is no reason why security cannot be addressed as the 
specialty engineering discipline it is. 
ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND DELIMITATIONS 
This section of the dissertation discusses the context of the study. 
Assumptions 
 (Edwards, 2005) states that the tradeoff between structure and unstructured 
representations exists for many types of information, but is especially problematic for 
contextual data for the following reasons: 
 
• Context represents information about people that is very often ambiguous by 
nature, subtle in its interpretation, and can be applied to many uses. 
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• There is a great range of information about humans that is potentially useful 
(ranging from general information about a user’s location or actions, to 
domain-dependent information such as a user’s context in a specific 
application). 
• Different sorts of context are important to different applications. 
 
As such, we are assuming we can structure contextual data sufficiently for use within the  
 
field of the study of security policy. 
Limitations 
 
The primary limitation of this research is the selection of an appropriate enterprise 
level application with a sufficiently robust security context.   An example with a 
simplistic policy will be successful, but may yield results only marginally better than a 
traditional digital access control policy.   On the other hand, an example with a highly 
complex policy may prove too difficult to model, or result in a narrative that is so 
complex that the casual reader would prefer formal methods as a more comprehensible 
approach.  
Delimitations 
To address all the factors associated with a meta-policy would be beyond the 
scope of this investigation.   Rather, the study is limited to the context of access control 
policies, as defined in NIST 800-53 (Government, Special Publication 800-53 rev. 4, , 
2011).  Table 1 enumerates the requirements family of access control requirements as 
enumerated in NIST 800-53.  The table presents the families of control requirements, and 
enumerates them in alphabetical order.   The controls are marked as applicable to high, 
medium, and low robustness systems, based upon the risk appetite deemed acceptable to 
the system’s designated authorization authority.   A system with a low robustness level 
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would have fewer access control requirements with lower levels of assurance associated 
with them.  A system with a high robustness level would have more stringent access 
control requirements with higher levels of assurance associated with the correct operation 
of the access controls.    NIST 800-53 defines three control baselines for automated 
information systems, designated as high, medium, and low robustness. 
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Table 1.  Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53. 
Control	  
Number	  
Control	  Name	  
Control	  Enhancement	  Name	  
Control	  Baselines	  
Low	   Mod	   High	  
AC-­‐1	   Access	  Control	  Policy	  and	  Procedures	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐2	   Account	  Management	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (1)	   Account	  Management|	  Automated	  System	  Account	  Management	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (2)	   Account	  Management|	  Removal	  of	  Temporary/Emergency	  
Accounts	  
	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (3)	   Account	  Management|	  Disable	  Inactive	  Accounts	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (4)	   Account	  Management|	  Automated	  Audit	  Actions	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (5)	   Account	  Management|	  Inactivity	  Logout/Typical	  Usage	  Monitoring	   	   	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (6)	   Account	  Management|	  Dynamic	  Privilege	  Management	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (7)	   Account	  Management|	  Role-­‐Based	  Schemes	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (8)	   Account	  Management|	  Dynamic	  Account	  Creation	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (9)	   Account	  Management|	  Restrictions	  on	  Use	  of	  Shared	  
Groups/Accounts	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (10)	   Account	  Management|	  Shared/Group	  Account	  
Requests/Approvals	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (11)	   Account	  Management|	  Shared/Group	  Account	  Credential	  
Renewals	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (12)	   Account	  Management|	  Usage	  Conditions	   	   	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (13)	   Account	  Management|	  Account	  Reviews	   	   	   X	  
AC-­‐2	  (14)	   Account	  Management|	  Account	  Monitoring/Atypical	  Usage	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐2	  (15)	   Account	  Management|	  Disable	  Accounts	  of	  High-­‐Risk	  Individuals	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	   Access	  Enforcement	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐3	  (1)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Restricted	  Access	  to	  Privileged	  Functions	   Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐6	  
AC-­‐3	  (2)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Dual	  Authorization	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (3)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Nondiscretionary	  Access	  Control	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (4)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Discretionary	  Access	  Control	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (5)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Security-­‐Relevant	  Information	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (6)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Protection	  of	  User	  and	  System	  Information	   Incorporated	  into	  MP-­‐
4	  and	  SC-­‐28	  
AC-­‐3	  (7)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Mandatory	  Access	  Control	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (8)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Role-­‐Based	  Access	  Control	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (9)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Revocation	  of	  Access	  Authorizations	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐3	  (10)	   Access	  Enforcement|	  Network	  Access	  Security-­‐Related	  Functions	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐4	  (1)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Object	  Security	  Attributes	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (2)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Processing	  Domains	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (3)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Condition/Operational	  Changes	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (4)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Content	  Check	  Encrypted	  Data	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (5)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Embedded	  Data	  Types	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (6)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Metadata	      
AC-­‐4	  (7)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  One-­‐Way	  Flow	  Mechanisms	      
AC-­‐4	  (8)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Security	  Policy	  Filters	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Table 1.  Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53 (cont.). 
Control	  
Number	  
Control	  Name	  
Control	  Enhancement	  Name	  
Control	  Baselines	  
Low	   Mod	   High	  
AC-­‐4	  (9)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Human	  Reviews	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (10)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Enable/Disable	  Security	  Policy	  
Filters	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (11)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Configuration	  of	  Security	  Policy	  
Filters	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (12)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Data	  Types	  Identifiers	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (13)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Decomposition	  into	  Policy-­‐
Relevant	  Subcomponents	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (14)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Policy	  Filter	  Constraints	  on	  Data	  
Structures	  and	  Content	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (15)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Detection	  of	  Unsanctioned	  
Information	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (16)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Information	  Transfers	  on	  
Interconnected	  Systems	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (17)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Domain	  Authentication	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (18)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Security	  Attribute	  Binding	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (19)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Protection	  of	  Metadata	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (20)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Classified	  Information	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐4	  (21)	   Information	  Flow	  Enforcement|	  Physical/Logical	  Separation	  of	  
Information	  Flows	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐5	   Separation	  of	  Duties	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐6	   Least	  Privilege	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐6	  (1)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Authorize	  Access	  to	  Security	  Functions	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐6	  (2)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Non-­‐Privileged	  Access	  for	  Nonsecurity	  Functions	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐6	  (3)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Network	  Access	  to	  Privileged	  Commands	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐6	  (4)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Separate	  Processing	  Domains	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐6	  (5)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Privileged	  Accounts	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐6	  (6)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Privileged	  Access	  by	  Non-­‐Organizational	  Users	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐6	  (7)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Review	  of	  User	  Privileges	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐6	  (8)	   Least	  Privilege|	  Privilege	  Levels	  for	  Code	  Execution	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐7	   Unsuccessful	  Login	  Attempts	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐7	  (1)	   Unsuccessful	  Login	  Attempts|	  Automatic	  Account	  Lock	   Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐7	  
AC-­‐7	  (2)	   Unsuccessful	  Login	  Attempts|	  Purge	  Mobile	  Device	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐8	   System	  Use	  Notification	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐9	   Previous	  Logon	  (Access)	  Notification	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐9	  (1)	   Previous	  Logon	  Notification|	  Unsuccessful	  Logons	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐9	  (2)	   Previous	  Logon	  Notification|	  Successful/Unsuccessful	  Logons	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐9	  (3)	   Previous	  Logon	  Notification|	  Notification	  of	  Account	  Changes	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐9	  (4)	   Previous	  Logon	  Notification|	  Additional	  Logon	  Information	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐10	   Concurrent	  Session	  Control	   	   	   X	  
AC-­‐11	   Session	  Lock	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐11	  (1)	   Session	  Lock|	  Pattern	  Hiding	  Displays	   Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐
11	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Table 1.  Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53 (cont.). 
Control	  
Number	  
Control	  Name	  
Control	  Enhancement	  Name	  
Control	  Baselines	  
Low	   Mod	   High	  
AC-­‐12	   Session	  Termination	   Incorporated	  into	  SC-­‐10	  
AC-­‐13	   Supervision	  and	  Review	  –	  Access	  Control	   Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐2	  
and	  AU-­‐6	  
AC-­‐14	  	   Permitted	  Actions	  without	  Identification	  or	  Authentication	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐14	  (1)	   Permitted	  Actions	  without	  Identification	  or	  Authentication|	  
Necessary	  Uses	  
Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐14	  
AC-­‐15	   Automated	  Marking	   Incorporated	  into	  MP-­‐3	  
AC-­‐16	  	   Security	  Attributes	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (1)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Dynamic	  Attribute	  Association	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (2)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Attribute	  Value	  Changes	  by	  Authorized	  
Individuals	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (3)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Maintenance	  of	  Attribute	  Associations	  by	  
Information	  Systems	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (4)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Association	  of	  Attributes	  by	  Authorized	  
Individuals	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (5)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Attribute	  Displays	  for	  Output	  Devices	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (6)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Maintenance	  of	  Attribute	  Association	  by	  
Organization	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (7)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Consistent	  Attribute	  Interpretation	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (8)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Association	  Techniques/Technologies	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (9)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Attribute	  Reassignment	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (10)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Attribute	  Configuration	  by	  Authorized	  
Individuals	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (11)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Permitted	  Attributes	  for	  Specified	  
Information	  Systems	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐16	  (12)	   Security	  Attributes|	  Permitted	  Values	  and	  Ranges	  for	  Attributes	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐17	   Remote	  Access	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐17	  (1)	   Remote	  Access|	  Automated	  Monitoring/Control	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐17	  (2)	   Remote	  Access|	  Protection	  of	  Confidentiality/Integrity	  Using	  
Encryption	  
	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐17	  (3)	   Remote	  Access|	  Managed	  Access	  Control	  Rights	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐17	  (4)	   Remote	  Access|	  Privileged	  Commands/Access	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐17	  (5)	   Remote	  Access|	  Monitoring	  for	  Unauthorized	  Connections	   Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐17	  
AC-­‐17	  (6)	   Remote	  Access|	  Protection	  of	  Information	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐17	  (7)	   Remote	  Access|	  Additional	  Protection	  for	  Security	  Function	  
Access	  
Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐3	  
AC-­‐17	  (8)	   Remote	  Access|	  Disable	  Nonsecure	  Network	  Protocols	   Incorporated	  into	  CM-­‐7	  
AC-­‐17	  (9)	   Remote	  Access|	  Disconnect/Disable	  Access	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐18	   Wireless	  Access	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐18	  (1)	   Wireless	  Access|	  Authentication	  and	  Encryption	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐18	  (2)	   Wireless	  Access|	  Monitoring	  Unauthorized	  Connections	   Incorporated	  into	  AC-­‐18	  
AC-­‐18	  (3)	   Wireless	  Access|	  Disable	  Wireless	  Networking	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Table 1.  Requirements family of access control from NIST 800-53(cont.). 
Control	  
Number	  
Control	  Name	  
Control	  Enhancement	  Name	  
Control	  Baselines	  
Low	   Mod	   High	  
AC-­‐18	  (4)	   Wireless	  Access|	  Restrict	  Configurations	  by	  Users	   	   	   X	  
AC-­‐18	  (5)	   Wireless	  Access|	  Confine	  Wireless	  Communications	   	   	   X	  
AC-­‐19	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐19	  (1)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Use	  of	  Writable/Removable	  
Media	  
Incorporated	  into	  MP-­‐7	  
AC-­‐19	  (2)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Use	  of	  Personally	  Owned	  
Removable	  Media	  
Incorporated	  into	  MP-­‐7	  
AC-­‐19	  (3)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Use	  of	  Removable	  Media	  
with	  No	  Identifiable	  Owner	  
Incorporated	  into	  MP-­‐7	  
AC-­‐19	  (4)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Restrictions	  for	  Classified	  
Information	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐19	  (5)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Personally	  Owned	  Devices	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐19	  (6)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Full	  Disk	  Encryption	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐19	  (7)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Central	  Management	  of	  
Mobile	  Devices	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐19	  (8)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Remote	  Purging	  of	  
Information	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐19	  (9)	   Access	  Control	  for	  Mobile	  Devices|	  Tamper	  Detection	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐20	   Use	  of	  External	  Information	  Systems	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐20	  (1)	   Use	  of	  External	  Information	  Systems|	  Limits	  on	  Authorized	  Use	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐20	  (2)	   Use	  of	  External	  Information	  Systems|	  Portable	  Storage	  Media	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐20	  (3)	   Use	  of	  External	  Information	  Systems|	  Personally	  Owned	  
Information	  Systems/Devices	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐20	  (4)	   Use	  of	  External	  Information	  Systems|	  Network	  Accessible	  
Storage	  Devices	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐21	   Collaboration	  and	  Information	  Sharing	   	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐21	  (1)	   Collaboration	   and	   Information	   Sharing|	   Automated	   Decision	  
Support	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐21	  (2)	   Collaboration	  and	  Information	  Sharing|	  Information	  Search	  and	  
Retrieval	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐22	   Publicly	  Accessible	  Content	   X	   X	   X	  
AC-­‐23	  	   Data	  Mining	  Protection	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐24	   Access	  Control	  Decisions	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐24	  (1)	   Access	  Control	  Decisions|	  Transmit	  Access	  Authorization	  
Information	  
	   	   	  
AC-­‐24	  (2)	   Access	  Control	  Decisions|	  No	  User	  or	  Process	  Identity	   	   	   	  
AC-­‐25	   Reference	  Monitor	  Function	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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The following terms are defined in this section with the origin of the definition in 
parenthesis after the term. 
 
Adequate Security  
(OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III) 
Security commensurate with the risk and 
magnitude of harm resulting from the loss, 
misuse, or unauthorized access to or 
modification of information. 
 
Assurance (CNSSI 4009) Measure of confidence that the security 
features, practices, procedures and 
architecture of an information system 
accurately mediate and enforce the security 
policy. 
 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
(NIST 800-53) 
Access control based on attributes associated 
with and about subjects, objects, targets, 
initiators, resources, or the environment.  An 
access control rule set defines the 
combination of attributes under which an 
access may take place. 
 
Audit Log (CNSSI 4009) A chronological record of information 
system activities, including records of system 
accesses and operations performed in a given 
period. 
 
Authentication (FIPS 200) Verifying the identity of a user, process, or 
device, often as a prerequisite to allowing 
access to resources in an information system. 
 
Availability (44 U.S. C., Sec. 3542) Ensuring timely and reliable access to and 
use of information. 
 
Classified Information (NIST 800-53)  Information that has been determined:(i) 
pursuant to Executive Order 12958 as 
amended by Executive Order 13292, or any 
predecessor Order, to be classified national 
security information; or (ii) pursuant to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to 
be Restricted Data (RD). 
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Baseline Configuration (NIST 800-53) A documented set of specifications for an 
information system, or a configuration item 
within a system, that has been formally 
reviewed and agreed on at a given point in 
time, and which can be changed only through 
change control procedures.  The baseline 
configuration is used as a basis for future 
builds, releases, and/or changes. 
 
Confidentiality (44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542) Preserving authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information. 
 
Controlled Unclassified Data (E.O. 
13556) 
A categorical designation that refers to 
unclassified information that does not meet 
the standards for National Security 
Classification under Executive Order 12958, 
as amended, but is (i) pertinent to the 
national interests of the United States or to 
the important interests of entities outside the 
federal government, and (ii) under law or 
policy requires protection from unauthorized 
disclosure, special handling safeguards, or 
prescribed limits on exchange or 
dissemination.   Henceforth, the designation 
CUI replaces Sensitive But Unclassified 
(SBU) 
 
Countermeasures (CNSSI 4009) Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or 
other measures that reduce the vulnerability 
of an information system.  Synonymous with 
security controls and safeguards. 
 
Cyber Attack (CNSSI 4009) An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an 
enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the 
purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, 
or maliciously controlling a computing 
environment/infrastructure; or destroying the 
integrity of the data or stealing controlled 
information. 
 
Cyber Security (CNSSI 4009) The ability to protect or defend the use of 
cyberspace from cyber attacks. 
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Cyberspace (CNSSI 4009) A global domain within the information 
environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information systems 
infrastructures including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer 
systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers. 
 
Defense-in-Depth (NIST 800-53) Information security strategy integrating 
people, technology, and operations 
capabilities to establish variable barriers 
across multiple layers and missions of the 
organization. 
 
Discretionary Access Control (NIST 800-
53) 
A type of access control that restricts access 
to objects based on the identity of the 
subjects or groups to which subjects belong.  
The access controls are discretionary because 
subjects with certain privileges are capable of 
passing those privileges on to any other 
subjects, either directly or indirectly.  
Nondiscretionary access controls restrict this 
capability. 
 
Domain (CNSSI 4009) An environment or context that includes a set 
of system resources and a set of system 
entities that have the right to access the 
resources as defined by a common security 
policy, security model, or security 
architecture.  See Security Domain. 
 
Enterprise (CNSSI 4009) An organization with a defined mission/goal 
and a defined boundary, using information 
systems to execute that mission, and with 
responsibility for managing its own risks and 
performance.  An enterprise may consist of 
all or some of the following business aspects:  
acquisition, program management, financial 
management (e.g., budgets), human 
resources, security and information systems, 
information, and mission management. 
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Enterprise Architecture (CNSSI 4009) The description of an enterprise’s entire set 
of information systems:  how they are 
integrated, how they interface to the external 
environment at the enterprise’s boundary, 
how they are operated to support the 
enterprise mission, and how they contribute 
to the enterprise’s overall security posture. 
 
Identity-Based Access Control (NIST 
800-53 
Access control based on the identity of the 
user (typically relayed as a characteristic of 
the process acting on behalf of that user) 
where access authorizations to specific 
objects are assigned based on the user’s 
identity. 
 
Information (CNSSI 4009) 
 
 
 
 
 
(FIPS 199) 
Any communication or representation of 
knowledge such as facts, data, or opinions in 
any medium or form, including textual, 
numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, 
or audiovisual. 
 
An instance of an information type. 
 
Information Owner (CNSSI 4009) Official with statutory or operational 
authority for specified information and 
responsibility for establishing the controls for 
its generation, collection, processing, 
dissemination, and disposal. 
 
Information Resources (44 U.S.C., Sec. 
3502) 
Information and related resources, such as 
personnel, equipment, funds, and information 
technology. 
 
Information Security (44 U.S.C., Sec 
3542) 
The protection of information and 
information systems from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction in order to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. 
 
Information Security Architecture (NIST 
800-53) 
An embedded, integral part of the enterprise 
architecture that describes the structure and 
behavior for an enterprise’s security 
processes, information security systems, 
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personnel and organizational sub-units, 
showing their alignment with the enterprise’s 
mission and strategic plans. 
 
Information Security Policy (CNSSI 
4009) 
Aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, 
and practices that prescribes how an 
organization manages, protects, and 
distributes information. 
 
Information System (44 U.S.C., Sec. 
3502) 
A discrete set of information resources 
organized for the collection, processing, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or 
disposition of information.  (Note:  
Information systems also include specialized 
systems such as industrial/process control 
systems, telephone switching and private 
branch exchange (PBX) systems, and 
environmental control systems.) 
 
Information Security Risk (NIST 800-53) The risk to organizational operations 
(including mission, functions, image, 
reputation), organizational assets, 
individuals, other organizations, and the 
Nation due to the potential for unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of information 
and/or information systems. 
 
Information System-Related Security 
Risks (NIST 800-53) 
Risks that arise through the loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information or information systems and 
consider impacts to the organization 
(including assets, mission, functions, image 
or reputation), individuals, other 
organizations and the Nation.  See Risk. 
 
Information Type (FIPS 199) A specific category of information (e.g., 
privacy, medical, proprietary, financial, 
investigative, contractor sensitive, security 
management) defined by an organization or 
in some instances by a specific law, 
Executive Order, directive, policy, or 
regulation. 
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Integrity (44 U.S.C., Sec 3542) Guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes 
ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity. 
 
Label (NIST 800-53) See Security Label. 
 
Local Access (NIST 800-53) Access to an organizational information 
system by a user (or process acting on behalf 
of a user) communicating through a direct 
connection without the use of a network. 
 
Malicious Code (NIST 800-53) Software or firmware intended to perform an 
unauthorized process that will have adverse 
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of an information system.  A 
virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-
based entity that infects a host.  Spyware and 
some forms of adware are also examples of 
malicious code. 
 
Marking (NIST 800-53) See Security Marking. 
 
Media (FIPS 200) Physical devices or writing surfaces 
including, but not limited to, magnetic tapes, 
optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale 
Integration (LSI) memory chips, and 
printouts (but not including display media) 
onto which information is recorded, stored, 
or printed within an information system. 
 
Metadata (NIST 800-53) Information describing the characteristics of 
data including, for example, structural 
metadata describing data structures (e.g., data 
format, syntax, and semantics) and 
descriptive metadata describing data contents 
(e.g., information security labels). 
 
Network (CNSSI 4009) Information system(s) implemented with a 
collection of interconnected components.  
Such components may include routers, hubs, 
cabling, telecommunications controllers, key 
distribution centers, and technical control 
devices. 
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Network Access (NIST 800-53) Access to an information system by a user 
(or a process acting on behalf of a user) 
communicating through a network (e.g., local 
area network, wide area network, Internet). 
 
Nondiscretionary Access Control (NIST 
800-53) 
A type of access control that restricts access 
to objects based on the identity of subjects or 
groups to which the subjects belong.  The 
access controls are nondiscretionary because 
subjects with certain privileges are restricted 
from passing those privileges on to any other 
subjects, either directly or indirectly – that is, 
the information system strictly enforces the 
access control policy based on the rule set 
established by the policy. 
 
Object (NIST 800-53) Passive information system-related entity 
(e.g. devices, files, records, tables, processes, 
programs, domains) containing or receiving 
information.  Access to an object (by a 
subject) implies access to the information it 
contains.  See Subject. 
 
Organization (FIPS 200) An entity of any size, complexity, or 
positioning within an organizational structure 
(e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any 
of its operational elements. 
 
Organizational User (NIST 800-53) An organizational employee or an individual 
the organization deems to have equivalent 
status of an employee (e.g., contractor, guest 
researcher, individual detailed from another 
organization, individual from an allied 
nation). 
 
Privileged Account (NIST 800-53) An information system account with the 
authorizations of a privileged user. 
 
Privileged User (CNSSI 4009) A user that is authorized (and therefore, 
trusted) to perform security-relevant 
functions that ordinary users are not 
authorized to perform. 
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Remote Access (NIST 800-53) Access to an organizational information 
system by a user (or a process acting on the 
behalf of a user) communicating through an 
external network (e.g., the Internet). 
 
Risk (FIPS 200) A measure of the extent to which an entity is 
threated by a potential circumstance or event, 
and typically a function of (i) the adverse 
impacts that would arise if the circumstance 
or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of 
occurrence. 
Information system-related security risks are 
those risks that arise from the loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information or information systems and 
reflect the potential adverse impacts to 
organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other 
organizations, and the Nation. 
 
Risk Assessment (NIST 800-53) The process of identifying risks to 
organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, reputation), organizational 
assets, individuals, other organizations, and 
the Nation, resulting from the operation of an 
information system.   
Part of risk management incorporates threat 
and vulnerability analyses, and considers 
mitigations provided by security controls 
planned or in place.  Synonymous with risk 
analysis. 
 
Risk Management (CNSSI 4009)  The program and supporting processes to 
manage information security risk to 
organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, reputation), organizational 
assets, individuals, other organizations, and 
the Nation, and includes: (i) establishing the 
context for risk related activities; (ii) 
assessing risk; (iii) responding to risk once 
determined; and (iv) monitoring risk over 
time. 
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Role-Based Access Control (NIST 800-
53) 
Access control based on user roles (i.e., a 
collection of access authorizations a user 
receives based on an explicit or implicit 
assumption of a given role).  Role 
permissions may be inherited through a role 
hierarchy and typically reflect the 
permissions needed to perform defined 
functions within an organization.  A given 
role may apply to a single individual or to 
several individuals. 
 
Security (CNSSI 4009) A condition that results from the 
establishment and maintenance of protective 
measures that enable an enterprise to perform 
its mission or critical functions despite risks 
posed by threats to its use of information   
systems.  Protective measures may involve a 
combination of deterrence, avoidance, 
prevention, detection, recovery, and correct 
that should form part of the enterprise’s risk 
management approach. 
 
Security Assurance (NIST 800-53) See Assurance. 
 
Security Attribute (NIST 800-53) An abstraction representing the basic 
properties or characteristics of an entity with 
respect to safeguarding information; typically 
associated with internal data structures (e.g., 
records, buffers, files), within the 
information system and used to enable the 
implementation of access control and flow 
control policies, reflect special 
dissemination, handling, or distribution 
instructions, or support other aspects of the 
information security policy. 
 
Security Domain (CNSSI 4009) A domain that implements a security policy 
and is administered by a single authority. 
 
Security Functions (NIST 800-53) The hardware, software, and/or firmware of 
the information system responsible for 
enforcing the system security policy and 
supporting the isolation of code and data on 
which the protection is based. 
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Security Label (NIST 800-53) The means used to associate a set of security 
attributes with a specific information object 
as part of the data structure for that object. 
 
Security Marking (NIST 800-53) Human-readable information affixed to 
information system components, removable 
media, or output indicating the distribution 
limitations, handling caveats, and applicable 
security markings. 
 
Security Policy (CNSSI 4009) A set of criteria for the provision of security 
services. 
 
Security Requirements (FIPS 200) Requirements levied on an information 
system that are derived from applicable laws, 
Executive Orders, directives, policies, 
standards, instructions, regulations, 
procedures, or organizational 
mission/business case needs to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
the information being processed, stored, or 
transmitted. 
 
Security-Relevant Information Any information within the information 
system that can potentially impact the 
operation of the security functions or the 
provision of security services in a manner 
that could result in failure to enforce the 
system security policy or maintain isolation 
of code and data. 
 
Subject (NIST 800-53) Generally an individual, process, or device 
causing information to flow among objects or 
change the system state.   See Object. 
 
Subsystem (NIST 800-53) A major subdivision or component of an 
information system consisting of 
information, information technology, and 
personnel that performs one or more specific 
functions. 
 
System (NIST 800-53) See Information System. 
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Threat (CNSSI 4009) Any circumstance or event with the potential 
to adversely impact organizational operations 
(including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation, organizational assets, individuals, 
other organizations, or the Nation through an 
information system via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, and/or denial of service. 
 
Trustworthiness (of an Information 
System) (NIST 800-53) 
The degree to which an information system  
(including the information technology 
components that are used to build the 
system) can be expected to preserve the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
the information being processed, stored, or 
transmitted by the system across the full 
range of threats.   A trustworthy information 
system is a system that is believed to be 
capable of operating within defined levels of 
risk despite the environmental disruptions, 
human errors, structural failures, and 
purposeful attacks that are expected to occur 
in its environment of operation. 
 
User (CNSSI 4009) Individual, or (system) process acting on 
behalf of an individual, authorized to access 
an information system. 
 
Vulnerability (CNSSI 4009) Weakness in an information system, system 
security procedures, internal controls, or 
implementation that could be exploited or 
triggered by a threat source. 
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SUMMARY 
In conclusion, we have presented the case for a more comprehensible system 
security policy definition; one that could be used to elicit information required for various 
security policy models and support a degree of formalism that would be amenable to 
formal methods and logical proof if desired.   More significantly, this policy elicitation 
through the use of structured storytelling would be a less intimidating, more descriptive 
technique that would lend itself to contextual security information such as that required 
for risk adaptive access control models. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
This section describes the relevant research literature associated with this proposal.  For 
completeness and clarity, this chapter addresses four distinct fields of research: 
• Security policies and modeling, 
• The use of artificial intelligence techniques,  
• The use of storytelling as a design tool, and 
• Computer assisted storytelling techniques. 
 
The combination of these fields of study forms the basis for the research.  
Security Policies and Modeling 
 
 In its most basic form, access control prevents unauthorized use of resources 
(Ferraiolo, D., Barkley, J.F., & Kuhn, D.R., 1999).  It involves an access controller that 
grants or denies the request of a subject to perform an operation on an object according to 
the access control policy.  The subject identifies an entity and its accompanying 
attributes.  The operation makes information flow to or from the object:  It is either read 
or written to system resources.   The operation includes access and the accompanying 
activities of collection, storage, processing and distribution of information.  The access 
policy specifies the usage rights of the subject to perform the operation on the object.   
The access controller executes subject authentication and access authorization.   The 
access controller performs subject authentication on the basis of the Token (T) and a 
Subject Identity (SID).  The access controller performs access authorization by 
determining the Permission of the Subject to execute the Operation on the Object.   
Figure 7 illustrates this information flow.   
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Figure 7 – The access control process (Hulsebosch, et al, 2005). 
Access control can be further delineated into real time access controls and non-
real time access controls.     Figure 8 represents a workflow for non-real-time access 
control.  Figure 9 represents a workflow for real-time access control decisions. 
Object
(Resource)Subject
(Principal)
Access
Controller
Operation ?
Grant/Deny
Supporting
Information
(SID, T)
Access Policy
(Permissions per subject)
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Figure 8.  The general process flow of non-real time access control (NIST, 2010, p.3). 
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Figure 9.  The process flow of real time access control decisions (NIST, 2010, p.3). 
The process flow of dynamic access control policies can be generalized as shown 
in Figure 10.  In this model, the activities of policy creation, conflict resolution, 
promulgation, and enforcement are decoupled steps in the policy distribution process.   
That is, a policy can be created, but may conflict with other operational needs and require 
resolution of such conflicting operations prior to distribution and enforcement at all nodes 
in a system.    
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Figure 10.  Processing flow to promulgate a dynamic access control policy (U.S. 
Government, 2004, p.3-25) 
(Burnside & Keromytis, 2007) state:  traditional access control mechanisms 
used in enterprise networks operate independently on each service.  When a user issues a 
request to a network service, the service’s access-control mechanism independently uses 
its security policy to make a decision on how to handle the request, and then goes 
inactive.   There may be information relevant to the decision elsewhere in the network, 
but the decision is made without consulting other network entities, so the component may 
arrive at a locally correct, but globally wrong decision. 
Role-based Access Control 
 
As has been stated above, RBAC was designed to better accommodate the actual 
usage scenarios of the civil government and commercial organizations.  Sandhu, Kuhn, 
and Ferraiolo (Sandhu, Kuhn, & Ferraiolo, 2000) formalized the definition of RBAC, and 
subsequently RBAC has been defined as an ANSI Standard (NCITS, 2004).  RBAC as a 
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model has been further formalized in (Gligor, 1995) (Park, Neven, & Diosomito, 2004) 
(Han, 2000) and many others.  RBAC has become the accepted implementation of access 
control in most commercial operating systems.  This has several benefits for system 
administrators, because in most organizations there are well-defined roles that can be 
institutionalized across the enterprise.  (Park, Neven, & Diosomito, 2004) defines three 
tiers of RBAC constraints within an enterprise:  the organizational hierarchy, the 
enterprise hierarchy, and the system hierarchy, and suggests these hierarchies can be 
interrelated and reused amongst organizations.  Figure 11 illustrates an RBAC 
implementation. 
There has been recent work to extend RBAC to address attribute based access 
control (ABAC) within the RBAC model (Kuhn, 2010).  Attribute based access control is 
based upon the user possessing a given attribute in his credentials to meet a rule for 
access to be granted (Karp, 2009).  ABAC is easy to establish, but difficult to change, and 
RBAC requires considerable attention to support sound role creation.   (Kuhn, 2010) 
proposes to apply a role structure to attributes that are relatively static, simplifying 
ABAC and supporting a more efficient attribute change process. 
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Figure 11 – An architecture for RBAC Implementation (Sherwood, Clark, & Lynas, 
2008, p. 241) 
Trust-based access control (TrustBAC) was proposed by (Chakraborty S. & Ray, 
I.., 2006) as a solution to provide increased flexibility for RBAC-type access models.  
TrustBAC is useful in decentralized models where the user population is dynamic and the 
identity of all users is not known in advance.  TrustBAC uses the authentication 
credentials of the user to create a binary trust relationship:  a user is either trusted or he is 
not.  Trust levels are introduced to address a user’s contextual credentials such as the 
user’s behavior history, and reputation.  These trust levels are then mapped to user roles 
and their associated permissions.   
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Context-based Access Control 
 
With the advent of wireless networks and intelligent devices, ubiquitous 
computing brought a new collection of access control policy issues. (Hengartner, 
2004) discusses the security issues associated with people location information, such 
as how much information should be shared about a person’s location.  Device privacy 
scenarios were introduced, where a person’s laptop or PDA may divulge their 
location without the owner’s permission.  In this case, access controls were 
established to the device location services and the person location services, and the 
information was protected in transit via conventional encryption technology. 
Ardanga, et.al. (2006) discussed integration of location-based conditions with access 
controls to accommodate mobile user interaction.   In this model, access is specified 
in terms of position, movement, and interaction of the user.  For example, if a user is 
within a given area, and moving slowly enough, access can be granted. 
 Spatial Security Policies 
 
 Location based services and mobile applications bring unique access control 
requirements to security policy models.   For example, consider the scenario of “If 
it’s my wife, I’ve just left” when the person is still in the office.  There have been 
numerous location alibis’ that have been denounced as the result of electronic toll 
collection transactions (Klunder).  (Bertino, Catania, Damiani, &  Perlasca, 2005), 
define a geospatial framework for RBAC policies that accommodates a spatially-
ware access control attribute (p.30).  Using the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) 
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spatial model (OpenGIS Consortium, 1999) a boundary perimeter can be associated 
with a user role, creating a binding between a user’s location and the access control 
policy.  For example, if the user is not within the building, he may not be permitted to 
view proprietary information.    
In (Lei, Daby, Davis, Banavar & Ebling), the concept of context awareness 
was introduced, where an application adapts to the environment to fulfill the needs of 
the user.  Lei discusses providing context awareness as a service to a user’s 
application environment, so the most appropriate presentation methods can be applied 
for data.  For example, a low bandwidth connection may not be suited to a graphics-
rich web environment or situational display.  The concept of a controller is introduced 
to specify the user’s context, an owner to specify how data is disseminated, and a 
client or application to collect authorized information.  While not an access control 
policy as such, the specification of a context service provides an illustrative example 
of how ubiquitous devices apply contextual access management. 
Within an RBAC environment, (Strembeck, 2004) proposes that contextual 
constraints can be considered a special purpose RBAC mechanism.  In this model, 
contextual constraints are subject to dynamic checking against predefined conditions 
or specified values.  Strembeck makes the distinction between static constraints that 
are specified at constraint establishment against constant values, as opposed to 
dynamic constraints that are evaluated against specific run-time parameters or 
variables. (pp. 395-396).  The notion of conditional permission is presented and 
defined as the case of access being granted if and only if each contextual constraint 
associated with that access evaluates as a true statement.  Using context constraints 
       
 
 
 52 
allows the traditionally static RBAC policy to incorporate dynamic data in its role 
evaluation processing.   
(Covington, Srinivasan, Dey, Ahamad, & Abowd, 2001) also discuss context-
based security, introducing the notion of environmental roles.  In this presentation, 
the context is that of a context aware environment, in which the behavior of the 
applications is tailored based on the user’s environmental context.  For example, an 
intelligent entertainment system may increase the volume and change the station on 
the radio depending upon whether the user is at work or at home.    In this model, the 
environmental state must be semantically represented, and the rules associated with 
that state captured for environmental context to be used for access management. 
Risk Adaptive Access Controls (RAdAC) 
 
 Pervasive connectivity does not accommodate static security policy modeling 
well.   To address the dynamic nature of policy management and policy-based access 
controls, Risk Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC) models have been proposed 
(McGraw, 2004).  These models address security based on the premise that 
information should be shared by default, as opposed to static need-to-know based 
models that by default protect information and make it unavailable for use.   RAdAC 
uses the dimensions of security risk and operational need in addition to the 
classification of the information and the clearance of the user (Choudhary, 2005 ,p. 
294).  For example, a unit on the front lines has a very strong operational need to 
know opposing military troop movements, but might be denied that information if not 
deployed.  RAdAC is an early attempt to adapt security policy to digital information 
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timelines as opposed to paper document models (p.294).   RAdAC models make 
access control decisions based upon the following components (p.295): 
• Characteristics of people 
• Characteristics of IT Components 
• Characteristics of content objects 
• Environmental factors 
• Situational factors 
• Heuristics 
• Digital Access Control Policies 
• Access Authorization Operator Interaction 
• User requests for access to a resource 
• Decision history and supporting rationale. 
 
Essentially, various policy elements are maintained in policy information bases 
(PIBs) (p. 295) and retrieved as required to address access requests.  If a request is 
granted, the information is presented to the user.   If a request is denied, subsequent 
PIBs are consulted, and the disposition of the request is based upon security 
heuristics or rules engines as well as static attributes associated with the user and the 
data. 
Context Sensitive Access Control 
 
 Context sensitive access control policies focus on the situational environment 
to determine if the user should be granted access to services (Hulsebosch, Salden, 
Bargh, & Ebben, 2005 p. 111).  In this model, the effective security controls of the 
physical world are used to define access controls.  These may be based upon location, 
velocity, age, device and/or network capabilities, temperature, time of day, and 
possibly the user’s intentions (p. 112).  If the patterns of behavior that can be derived 
from contextual information can be captured and grouped, an effective variant of 
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role-based access control can be created.   In this model, the access controller has to 
verify the contextual attributes provided by the subject to authenticate the subject’s 
request.   The access controller also has to bind the permissions in the access policy 
to the subject’s contextual attributes to perform the access authorization function.   
While context sensitive access control does require an infrastructure to collect, 
manage, and interpret contextual information, most of these functions could be 
performed as background tasks (p. 117).  The ability to apply contextual data to 
access control decisions would provide a more realistic model of access decision 
making in computing environments. 
Usage Based Access control  
 
 An advantage to ubiquitous computing environments is transparent access to 
information without regard for the underlying computing infrastructure (Wang, Zang, 
& Cao, 2006).  Within these environments, the mobility of the users presents 
challenges in the determination of the user’s contextual information and 
authentication.  Usage-based access control models augment traditional access 
control models with two additional elements: 
1. Obligations – requirements that have to be followed by the subject to 
allow access to resources, and 
2. Conditions – subject and object independent requirements that have to be 
passed to the access controller. 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the components of a usage based access control model. 
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Figure 12 – Usage based access control attributes. 
Collaborative Access Control Models 
 
 In the Web 3.0 world, collaborative systems become more prevalent.   Groups 
of users communicate and cooperate to address a common task (Tolone, Ahn, & Pai, 
2005). Information in collaborative applications may be of varied sensitivity.   The 
collaborative environment allows users to create, manipulate, and provide access to 
information and resources.   Collaboration depends upon making information 
available to those with a need to know, whereas access control models restrict access 
to information based upon the user’s defined confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
constraints.   In collaborative access control models: 
• Access control must be applied and enforced at a distributed platform 
level. 
• Should be expressive enough to specify access rights efficiently based 
upon varied information. 
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• Must scale to address the number of shared operations expected in 
collaborative multi-user environments. 
• Support access decisions for resources and information at varying 
levels of granularity. 
• Support transparent access for authorized users and strong exclusion of 
unauthorized users; yet support unrestrained collaboration. 
• Allow high-level specification of access rights, to facilitate complexity 
management. 
• Support dynamic modification at runtime to reflect the environment or 
collaboration dynamics. 
 
Along with traditional access control models, the concept of Team based access 
control (Thomas, 1997) is examined to provide integration of user context and object 
context into the access control space.  Figure 13 illustrates TBAC’s information flow. 
 
Figure 13 – The Team Based access control model (Tolone, et al, p. 36). 
The authors then proceed to contrast and compare existing access control models, 
searching for the best fit of characteristics that address collaborative architectures.  A 
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context based access control model is suggested that accommodates dynamic user 
participation and fine grained object models. 
Semantic Access Controls 
 
 (Pan, Mitra, & Liu, 2006) propose the use of semantically enhanced role-
based access control to facilitate database interoperability.  Their model incorporates 
ontology mapping to accommodate semantic heterogeneity in conjunction with 
confidentiality constraints associated with data sharing among organizations.  They 
contend that preserving access control across semantically heterogeneous information 
systems is more accurately termed semantic access control.   When a query is issued 
that may cross database boundaries, the roles, tables, and columns are validated 
against the corresponding roles, tables, and columns of the other databases within an 
information system.   Access controls are translated in real time in response to a 
subject’s query.   Figure 14 illustrates the semantic access control model. 
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Figure 14 – Information flow in the semantic access control model (Pan, Mitra, & 
Liu, p. 240). 
THE USE OF VARIOUS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES 
As is evident from the discussion above, there is no shortage of formal policy 
models.   What is lacking are techniques for integrating the formalism of policy 
modeling with policy elicitation mechanisms to understand the rules a customer 
wishes to enforce upon information sharing. In this section, we explore the relevant 
contributions from the fields of artificial intelligence to this effort. 
(Atallah,  McDonough, Raskin, & Nirenburg, 2000) presented four areas 
where natural language processing techniques could benefit the information security 
community.   One of these four areas was the area of ontology and its application to 
machine translation techniques.   This research team had developed a semi-
automatically acquired ontology, with a semi-automatically acquired lexicon for over 
40,000 words.   Further, an analyzer was created to translate text from a natural 
language into a text-meaning representation and a generator to translate the text 
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meaning representation into a given natural language.   This use of ontological 
semantics was being applied to the problem of document sanitization or redaction, 
where some text needs to be removed before a document is approved for public 
release.   Essentially, the workings of a human reviewer were modeled and codified 
into a rule base that applied Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques.    
Of interest:  the authors state that the primary function of natural language is 
communication among humans (p. 64), the most common mode that of fact-
conveying.  In this mode, the speaker and the listener are committed to the literal 
truth of what is said, but each interprets it differently based upon their understanding.  
In Natural Language Processing, this brings to bear the problems of 
underspecification, namely vagueness and ambiguity.   Simply put, no one spoken 
sentence can capture all the semantic meaning of a given context.   The human mind 
applies prior knowledge and inferences to fill in the missing data. 
Subsequently, (Raskin, Hempelmann, & Triezenberg, 2004) presented an 
experiment in ontological semantics as a a technique to determine deception.  The 
approach proposed represents words as meanings, including the sentences and their 
text, and performs logical manipulation; resulting in a system that can identify 
specific facts or events that contribute to the deception and of understanding what the 
truth behind the deception is.  (Raskin, Hempelmann, Nierenberg,  & Triezenberg, 
2001) further define a comprehensive ontology for the domain of information 
assurance, providing a sound foundation for further research in the domain. 
(Owen, Wakeman, Keller, Weeds, & Weir, 2005) discuss pervasive 
computing environments and conclude that non-technical users will want to be able to 
configure their own devices.   In their research, a series of user studies were 
conducted to determine how people define the term “configuration.”   Once the 
meaning of system configuration was defined, it was possible to determine a 
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formalism and create a natural language processing system to address the question, 
with a policy management engine to enforce system configuration policies.   The 
authors conclude that description logic is a powerful formalism for policy 
representation, and that the state of natural language processing is getting close to 
direct  policy conversion to machine language.  Therefore, for at least one well-
defined domain, natural language machine processing is quite feasible. 
(Shi & Chadwick, 2011) state that when asked, users already intuitively know 
the access control policy associated with a given set of resources.  If asked, the person 
will say yes or no according to a set of rules associated with their domain.   However, 
translation of those rules into an executable policy requires specialized knowledge the 
user may not have.   To counter this knowledge gap, the authors created a controlled 
natural language interface to allow the user to enter the policy, which is then 
translated to OWL’s  relational ontology or XACML.   Roles are created first, then 
permissions are assigned to each role to implement the controls.  These capabilities 
are then parsed by a natural language parser to create rules that can be exported to the 
desired format.  User trials were conducted with instructions to create a short policy 
from a given usage scenario,  and evaluated against XACML statements for 
correctness.   The natural language interface scored approximately sixty percent 
satisfaction in trials.  The authors contend that because natural language can specify 
the same fact in several different manners,  the parser does not interpret them all 
congruently.    The existing prototype does not address complex conditional policy 
statements that would be needed to enforce constraint based security policies. 
Finally, we examine PolicyMorph, a constraint system that supports 
interactive policy development and maintenance as Access Decision Functions (ADF)  
(LeMay,  Fatemieh, & Gunter, 2007).  PolicyMorph is designed to interactively assist 
administrators with attribute based access control constraints.  The tool reports 
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constraint violations and suggests resolutions to them in priority order.   Further, 
PolicyMorph does not force the administrator to encode all constraints in formal 
language prior to analysis.  Both an ABAC policy language and a logical constraint 
language are embodied in the authoring environment, and both are based on first-
order logic and encoded in Prolog.  The authors present a case study embodying 
separation of duty constraints.   The resulting output does prioritize conflicts, but does 
not appear user friendly.  The authors indicate a graphical user interface is their next 
priority to allow less sophisticated users to apply the environment. 
(Reeder, Karat, Karat, & and Brodie, 2007)   address usability challenges in 
security and privacy policy authoring interfaces.  They state that as pervasive 
computing grows, users who will have to specify security policy will become less 
sophisticated in their expertise.  Therefore, usable policy-authoring interfaces are 
becoming more necessary in the marketplace.  Using IBM’s SPARCLE workbench as 
an environment, they conducted a usablity study on policy authoring.  There were 
five general challenges that must be addressed if a policy authoring infrastructure will 
be useful: 
 
1. support for object grouping, 
2. enforcement of consistent terminology, 
3. making default rules clear, 
4. communicating and enforcing rule structures, and 
5. preventing rule conflicts. 
A usability study was conducted with summer office interns, who were 
considered novice application users.   Data collected during the study included the 
text of rules written, video of the subject and the computer screen, any think-aloud 
audio, and a demographic survey.  Output was examined to address rule syntax, and 
then user activities were analyzed to determine if the subject was able to self-correct 
problem rules in the process.  The results of their study corroborated the usability 
issues presented as the primary issues in creating a usable policy authoring interface.   
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Essentially, users do not wish to input large lists of data with minimal feedback as to 
the correctness of syntax. 
(Johnson, Karat, Karat, & and Gruenberg, 2010) discuss using policy 
templates to facililty security policy authoring to proivde consistent policy interfaces 
across diverse policies.   The templates are designed to provide a structured format to 
capture data.   Iterative policy refinement is applied to address policy authoring, 
template authoring, and policy element definition as distinct steps in the policy 
creation process.   The use of a structured template, in conjunction with the three 
roles associated with policy authoring, proved quite useful and policies could be 
created by less sophisticated users.   The authors are exploring how to extract network 
resources to present the user with policy options appropriate for the domain of use. 
(Johnson, Karat, Karat, & and Gruenberg, Optimizing a Policy Authoring 
Framework for Security and Privacy Policies, 2010) conducted further research in 
policy authoring with templates and determine that there were three additional criteria 
that needed to be added to policy authoring environments: 
 
1. Support for appropriate limitations of expressivity (allow writing of deny 
policies or allow policies, but not both). 
2. Communicate risks and threats associated with a given policy. 
3. Provide access to the metadata for reference purposes. 
 
The author’s stress the need for extensibility in policy authoring tools to 
facilitate development of sound policy that matches the user’s intended purpose. 
As early as 1987 (Ayuso, Varda, & Weischedel, 1987) stated:  “the success of 
all National Language Interface technology is predicated upon the availability of 
substantial knowledge bases containing information about the syntax and semantics 
of words, phrases, and idioms, as well as knowledge of the domain and of discourse 
context. 
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Semantic knowledge includes at least two kinds of information:  selectional 
restrictions or case frame constraints which can serve as a filter on what makes sense 
semantically, and rules for translating the word senses present in an input into an 
underlying semantic representation.   Beyond these elements: 
• Basic facts about the domain must be acquired, at minimum taxonomic 
information about the semantic categories in the domain and binary 
relationships between semantic categories. 
• Knowledge that relates the predicates in the domain to their representation and 
access in the underlying systems. 
• Sets of domain plans to allow understanding of narrative and to follow the 
structure of discourse.   Otherwise known as being able to interpret narrative 
in the context of stated future direction. 
In IRAQ, there are 3 levels of representation for the concepts, actions, and 
capabilities of the domain.  The domain model is separate from the model of the 
entities in the underlying system. 
 (Edwards, 2005) stated that a variety of tradeoffs that have to be made 
between structured and unstructured representations for many types of information.  
These trades become especially problematic in the case of contextual information for 
the following reasons:  
 
• Context represents information about people that is very often 
ambiguous by nature, subtle in its interpretation, and can be applied to 
many uses. 
• There is a great range of information about humans that is potentially 
useful (ranging from general information about users’ locations or 
actions, to domain-dependent information such as a user’s context in a 
specific application). 
• Different sorts of context are important to different applications. 
While highly structured data representations are amenable to use by applications 
(they can be easily machine parsed, processed and stored) they are problematic in 
situations where the needs of the applications are evolving; where the range of 
information that must be represented is very great; and when agreement among 
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multiple applications is required, in other words, the very situations posed by context-
aware computing.  
Storytelling As A Design Tool 
 In Human Computer Interaction, a mental model is a set of assumptions or 
beliefs about how a system works.  People interact with systems according to their 
beliefs and assumptions about the system.   Constantine and Lockwood (1999) define 
4 criteria for product usability:  learnability, retainability, efficiency of use, and user 
satisfaction.  Learnability and retainability reflect on the role of mental models in 
usability.   To the extent that a correct mental model could be learned and retained by 
the user, the user will become more effective. 
  Asgharpour, Liu, & Camp (2007) discuss five widely used conceptual mental 
models of security risks implicit in language or explicit in metaphors: 
 
1. Physical safety – implicit in descriptions of locks and keys.   This concept 
implies individual and localized control. 
2. Medical Infections – security incidents interpreted as medical infections 
are grounded in the patterns of diffusion of malicious code as  infectious 
diseases, and the importance of heterogeneity in the larger network, 
conceptualized as an ecosystem of security. 
3. Criminal behavior – security violations can be crimes or may seem to be 
criminal.   The concept of computer risks as risk of being a victim of crime 
implies that users or machines are targeted. 
4. Warfare – implies the existence of a determined, implacable enemy, with 
the potential to leverage horror by leveraging the horrors or war. 
5. Economic Failure – Security and network or software vulnerabilities can 
be seen as market failures.  Vulnerabilities are perceived as external 
events; security failures cause downtime and expenses. 
(Wash & Rader, 2011) discussed mental models, or how a user thinks about a 
problem, the model in the person’s mind of how things work.   The model allows the 
person to make decisions about the effects of various actions.  For example, if hackers 
are perceived to be curious teenagers, the threat of criminal activity is perceived to be 
low.  The critical point about mental models is that even if they are incorrect, they can 
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still lead to good security behaviors and more secure computer systems.   Further, 
mental models of security threats are based on reasoning about information provided 
by stories recounted by friends and colleagues.   This has been described as a folk 
model or lay theory created out of shared community experiences.   Wash further 
states that to improve home security get home computer users to train each other and 
create good mental models. 
Users rely on others for security because they feel like they don’t have the 
skills to maintain proper security themselves, so they often try to avoid security 
decisions (p. 3).  They find ways to delegate the responsibility to some external entity 
defined as technological (a firewall), social (another person or IT staff) or 
institutional (a bank).   Three common approaches to address this issue are: 
 
1. Technical solutions to take the decision out of the end users’ hands.  
The stupid human approach requires a one size fits all security 
solution, but people use computers in vary diverse ways. 
2. Educational approaches try to teach the details of computer security.  
As long as it isn’t too complicated it stands a chance, at least in the 
short term. 
3. How to support and encourage good behavior.  How do people form 
their perceptions? 
 
Wash & Rader believe that people form mental models of threats to security based 
on information they receive in the form of stories from other people like themselves, 
from their media, and from their experience.  A “mental model is a cognitive 
representation in a person’s mind of how things work:  how a person reasons and 
makes inferences about a situation, allow people to make predictions about what 
might happen, and provide heuristics and guidelines to base behavioral choices (p. 
1).”  The mental model provides a chain of theories that help us reason about what to 
do next. 
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Social information sharing is an important way that we learn about the world 
around us and our behavior in the world.  Narratives, stories told by other people, are 
an important component of our ability to learn about the world around us and behave 
appropriately.  Stories tell people about each other, acting as observational learning 
and helping to avoid other’s mistakes.   Stories about others reveal useful information 
about how culture and society operate.   Stories provide a way to learn from other’s 
experience.  Stories that affirm what is already represented in our mental models are 
remembered more easily, are given more weight, and are more likely to be passed on. 
(Triantafyllakos, Palaigeorgiou, & Tsoukalas, 2008) present the argument that 
collaborative design is actually a narrative, a way to deconstruct the design process.  
They propose the theory that output of collaboration is actually a design story, in that 
it is the result of a chain of events and the interaction of a collection of characters.  
Further, the way that output is communicated is also a story in that it is the story of 
the item being designed, the people that will use it, and the affect caused by the use of 
the item.   Designers and customers become readers and actors in the design process 
story and co-authors of the product.   The design team leader becomes the narrator, 
and, in the delivery of the product, becomes the critical reader of the story. 
Chatham (Chatham, 1978) discusses the author as the manipulator of narrative 
elements including character, setting, and events to construct the design story that is 
recounted and revised throughout the design process.   Chatham states that narrative 
transmission is concerned with the manner in which the story’s events are presented 
during the recounting of the narrative.  The most important aspect of the narrative 
transmission in Chatham’s model is the organization of the story’s events, when the 
narrative begins, climaxes, and ends.  Different design processes may have different 
stories, and different end products.   
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The designer is responsible for structuring the process such that the design 
stays on cost and schedule while accommodating the design team’s creativity and 
innovation throughout the narrative (Triantafyllakos, Palaigeorgiou, & Tsoukalas, 
2008, p. 212).  In this role the team leader is responsible for the maintenance of the 
team’s inner monologue as it progresses through the various design decisions and 
events. 
(Erickson, 1996) talks about story as an integral part of the design process, a 
technique to generate discussion, inform the user, and persuade the users.   Design is 
a collaborative activity between the designer and the customer, and has become a 
distributed social process as enterprise applications have grown in scope and 
structure.  Erickson uses story as a change management tool, to make the user feel in 
control of his situation when technology is overwhelming the situation   The metric is 
not the story itself, but the fact that the audience relates to it and responds, offering 
opinions on topics that they may not have otherwise offered inputs about.   Stories 
help define what is important, what the user’s environment is like, and set the stage 
for more formal design methods.   Finally, stories are memorable, in that a good story 
is talked about with others and they are relatively informal.    They are not expected 
to be precise, so they discuss the issues, not the minituae that delay the design 
process. 
Computer Assisted Storytelling and Analysis 
In (Nissan, 2008), narrative is proposed as a communication medium among 
avatars in a virtual world or robots performing a collective function.    Nissan 
observes that “narrative is pervasive; even the reasoning process unfolds in a 
narrative way (p. 518).  “At a formal level, narrative governs argument in that 
arrangement, the ordering or internal progression of a discourse, depends upon a 
narrative structure in which a premise is elaborated, developed, proved or refuted.  
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Narrative as arrangement is in this sense intrinsic to logic as well as to dialectic and 
rhetoric” (Goodrich, 2007, p. 348 in Nissan, 2008). 
Further on, Nissan quotes (Ryan, 2005, p.347) in the definition of a story: 
 
1. The mental representation of a story involves the construction 
of the mental image of the world populated with individual 
agents  (characters) and objects (spatial dimension). 
2. The world must undergo not fully predictable changes of state 
that are caused by non-habitual physical events:  either 
accidents (“happenings”) or deliberate actions by intelligent 
agents (temporal dimension). 
3. In additon to being linked to physical states by causal relations, 
the physical events must be assoicated with mental states and 
events (goals, plans, emotions).  This network of connections 
gives events coherence, motivation, closure, and intelligibility 
and turns them into a plot (logical, mental, and formal 
dimension). 
 
Essentially, a story lives in five distinct dimensions (spatial, temporal,  
logical, mental, and formal).  In working with robots or virtual avatars, Nissan poses 
that what is habitual or routine can be captured in a behavioral specification language, 
and what in non-routine is significant.   The non-routine activity can then be 
processed against known patterns of activity (p.518). 
At this point Nissan moves into a discussion on the analysis of common folk 
tales.  Folk tales are inspired by some historical event that has been adapted to the 
current situation.   In this manner, events are handed down through the oral tradition 
and are transformed by being brought into harmony with the thematic patterns of the 
current day.   For example, Rumpelstilskin was originally documented by the 
Brothers Grimm in the 1812 Edition of Children’s and Household Tales.    The folk 
tale exists across the Scandinavian and European countries in various forms.   
Further, we can recognize the situational pattern in current society:    
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 “Rumpelstiltskin Syndrome” is an analogical reference to the role of 
the king in the story of Rumpelstiltskin.  Common practice in middle 
management is to impose unreasonable work demands on 
subordinates.  Upon completion of the task or tasks in question, equal 
or higher work demands are then imposed; moreover, no credit, 
acknowledgement, or overt appreciation is demonstrated by way of 
recognition” (Beatie, 1976). 
 
Nissan makes the case that robotic operations can be defined by a taxonomy 
of situations (p. 524).  This taxonomy can apply the thematic patterns of folktales, 
which have already been extracted in the work of Vladimir Popp (Popp, 1968); who 
proposed a mathematical model for the thematic patterns in folktales, which can be 
adapted for machine generated narrative. Popp’s work facilitated the creation of story 
grammars and automatic story processing.  Popp postulated that there were twenty-
two specific folktale functions, or actions, and nine more that were considered 
preparatory functions in the story introductions.   Aarne and Thompson (Uther, 2004) 
classified folktale narratives into categories of stories based on the actions and moral 
lessons to be learned. 
(Cavazza M. and Pizzi, 2006) provides a critical overview and introduction to 
interactive storytelling systems, which integrates artificial intelligence techniques to 
generate narrative action sequences and animation.  The authors translate Popp’s 
characterization of folktale functions into narrative events, such as transgression, 
deception, wedding, struggle, and punishment.  These functions form primitives that 
are used to construct sequences of events (p. 73), and provide a formalism for 
narrative structure.  The four primary points of Popp’s work are: 
1.  Narrative functions are the basic primitives of folktales.  They 
are stable and invariant elements, independent from the 
characters that execute them, and from the modalities of their 
execution. 
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2. There are a limited number of such functions, which form 
      the primitives. 
3. Functions will always occur in the same order, although any 
given folktale may use a proper subset.    
4. The order does not allow backtracking.   
 
Beyond this structure, Greimas (Cavazza M. and Pizzi, 2006, p. 74) built a 
role-based analysis of narratives.   The concept of an actant, was added to define 
characters. Actants were defined in pairs of oppositional characters, such as Subject 
v. Object.   With the addition of Greimas’ actants and Popp’s functions, we now have 
the actions and characters required to build a story.    
In (Brooks, 1996), the observation is made that stories tend to be written in a 
linear fashion, and are perceived by the audience within the context of their cultural 
experience.  Stories tend to be told sequentially, with a beginning, middle, and end 
state.  However, they are not usually created sequentially.  Authors start with an idea, 
and may begin in the middle or at the end of the story.  The finished product is 
refined over several drafts; revised at the request of editors, directors, or producers; 
and eventually goes to press, where the intended audience votes with their wallets on 
the author’s success or failure.  Figure 15 illustrates the sequential nature of story 
production.   
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Figure 15 – The traditional model of story creation. 
The notion of computational narrative explores the customization of the 
storytelling experience for each audience member.  In a computational narrative 
model, the audience actively participates in the navigation of the story.  For example, 
a game such as Adventure or Dungeon and Dragons takes different execution 
branches depending on the user’s decisions.  With a computational narrative model, 
the story can be tailored to reflect each participant’s perceptions. 
 Kevin M. Brooks at the MIT Media Lab conducted one of the early 
experiments in computational narrative  (Brooks, 1996).  Brooks decomposed a story 
into 3 atomic components: 
1. Events, 
2. People, or characters, and 
3. Things. 
 
These three components are built into a narrative, which describes the organization of 
information.  A narration explains how the narrative is expressed to the intended 
audience.  For example, a movie may start as a narrative created by the screenwriter.  
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As it moves through production, various other experts such as costumers, dialogue 
coaches, and the director may alter the narrative over several iterations.  The resulting 
end product is the narration.  Figure 16 illustrates the iterative nature of narration 
creation. 
 
Figure 16 – The actual way narrative is created. 
 Brooks believed that a story could connect the creator with the audience 
through a computational model.  In Brooks’ model, a narration was created through 
four different processes: 
1. The representation process – which defined the components of the story. 
2. The presentation process - determining how the components are revealed to 
the audience. 
3. The reasoning process – which applies logical inferences about the 
components based on the representation. 
4. The reasoning engine – which coordinates the processes of reasoning, 
representation, and presentation, and provides the results to the audience. 
 
Through the use of behavior-based artificial intelligence, the reasoning engine in 
Brooks’ model was capable of adapting either to the audience’s response or to the 
creator’s manipulation of the elements, based on the inference engine’s recalculation 
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of the story line.  Figure 17 illustrates the computational narrative model of story 
creation. 
 
Figure 17.  The creation of a narrative, computer generated. 
Brooks further defined three components of a computational narrative: 
 
1. The representational environment – which reasons about the world 
presented in a given story. 
2. The structural environment, or story framework – which provides the 
basic story events, such as characters, conflicts, resolution, diversions, and 
endings. 
3. The presentation environment – which presents the results of the 
interpretation of the story framework and the representation to the 
audience, and delivers feedback to the artist for subsequent structure and 
story manipulation. 
 
The computational narrative model thus defined was applied as the basis for the 
Agent Story environment, an early prototype for interaction between the creator and 
the audience in storytelling environments. 
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From the preliminary perspective provided by Brooks, research continued into how to 
capture collaboration among authors and tell stories from alternative viewpoints.  
Mazalek and Davenport have explored the use of interaction platforms to define the 
structural environment and help the audience develop a frame of reference (Mazalek 
A. and Davenport, G., 2003).  With their colleague Ishii, Mazalek and Davenport 
(Mazalek A. et al., 2003) developed a Tangible Viewpoints system to allow 
collaborative authors to choose a story’s direction through the manipulation of pawn-
like tokens on a game screen.  With this model, the data is represented in 3-
dimensions, and the collaborators can maintain a frame of reference for each 
character of interest (Mazalek A. et al., 2002).  Case study experiments of how the 
Tangible Viewpoints model works in actual collaborations are included in their work. 
 Zagalo and Szilas proposed refinements to the basic framework of a story.  In 
(Zalago, Barker, & Branco, 2004), emotion as a feedback mechanism is introduced, 
and a feedback notation for detection, categorization, and intensity is feedback 
provided by the story agents.  Szilas looks at action as a narrative structure element 
that augments the story framework as a refinement mechanism based on audience 
interaction (Szilas, 2004). 
SUMMARY 
To conclude our review of the literature, we have a large and diverse set of 
security policies that have formal models.   We have several policy authoring tools 
that explore templates, constrained natural languages, and graphical authoring 
environments.  Further, we have a collection of analytical tools to disassemble 
narrative text and story elements into their basic components for textual analysis.   
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However, the policies discussed are highly formal, the policy authoring environments 
constrain the user in syntax and expression, and the narrative analysis tools have not 
been applied to security policies.    
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This chapter describes the research methodology, the research methods to be 
employed, development and validation of the experiment, results presentation, and 
resources required to complete the experiment. Recall, the high-level goal is to 
determine the feasibility of defining a top-level narrative-based security policy that 
can (a) support a significant degree of formalism; (b) accommodate verification of 
completeness and  (c) traceability to lower-level functional system specifications.  
The research objective is the definition of the logical security principles that comprise 
the system security policy such that: 
(a) they can govern system behavior,  
(b) are enforceable throughout the system design process, and 
(c) are comprehensible to the system stakeholders.  
 
An end-user should never have to be concerned with the format of an access 
control list or firewall rule: a general statement of access management should be 
traceable to lower-level implementation specific constraints. Our hypothesis is that 
the security policy elements required to implement complex security meta-policies 
can be best expressed as story or narrative elements, which can be decomposed into 
sub-policies and system requirements.  The eventual result of such decomposition is 
that the policy enforcement mechanisms can be explicitly traced back to the specific 
story elements within the top-level policy statement. 
Overview of the Research Methodology 
There are few research methodologies that have been successfully applied to 
the domain of security policy.  Unlike traditional computational research, there are no 
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performance measures associated with security policy.  That is, one cannot say that a 
given policy results in a faster solution N-percent of the time, or that one policy 
requires more execution statements than another.  Therefore the research 
methodology selected for this project is a qualitative research model, in particular a 
grounded theory methodology as described by Creswell (2013).  Creswell 
differentiates narrative studies as those creating a portrait of an individual (p. 122), 
and ethnography as the study of a culture-sharing group on a large scale (p. 122).  
Neither of these qualitative methodologies applies to security policy research.  
Examination of most security policy research indicates an emphasis on formal proof 
of a given security policy model (Bell D. , 1994) (Bell D. & LaPadula, L., 1976) 
(Bertino, Ferrari, & Perlasca, 2001) (Gligor, 1995) (Lin, 2000). These models 
essentially are logical case studies that emulate specific elements of behavior.   
Phenomenology does not apply, as this research does not focus on the lived 
experiences of individuals around a phenomenon, such as a war or a cultural 
revolution (Cresswell, 2013).   
This leaves the qualitative methodology of grounded theory.  Our objective 
was to generate a substantive theory and validate it through systematic procedures for 
data collection, analysis and categorization, and specification of the context and 
conditions under which the theory operated (p. 123). 
Specific Research Method(s) to be Employed 
 Grounded theory methodology (GTM) is a systematic, qualitative procedure 
to extract information (Chakraborty & Dehlinger, 2009).  GTM can be further  
described as “a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to 
develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon” (Strass & 
Corbin, 1998).  A worked example of the application of GTM to enterprise system 
requirements is presented in Chakraborty & Dehlinger (p. 333), who apply GTM to: 
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• Present a structured, qualitative analysis method to identify 
enterprise requirements 
• Provide a basis to verify enterprise requirements via high-level 
enterprise architecture objectives 
• Allow for the representation of business strategy in a requirements 
engineering context 
• Enable the traceability of enterprise architecture objectives in the 
requirements engineering and design phases. 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the coding phases of GTM in the context of 
requirements engineering, as interpreted by Chakraborty & Dehlinger (p. 335). 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  Coding phases of GTM in the context of requirements engineering (p. 
335).   
Similarly, Lehmann (2010) discusses the application of GTM to Information 
Systems, which are defined as action networks of technology and people.   Lehmann 
contends that GTM was originally created to uncover social theory from empirical 
data generated across a broad spectrum of contexts and activities, and to create 
theoretical foundations which were nonexistent (p.1).  Indeed, GTM is defined as the 
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discovery of theory from data – systematically obtained and analyzed in social 
research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Essentially, GTM is a simple research sequence:  
“I gathered data and once the data was arranged in neat piles, I wrote them up” 
(Stoller, 1987).  The arrangement of the data, or its coding, are defined in three steps 
in Miles and Huberman (Miles, 1994): 
 
1. Commonalities in the data are captured in descriptive codes to 
more clearly capture the essential attributes of the phenomenon; 
2. As more data and codes are available, interpretive codes are 
abstracted from the idiographic confines of the concrete incidents 
to help understand what is going on behind the data; 
3. Lastly, inferential pattern codes, now abstract of space and time 
and etic to the substantive range of the research, are 
conceptualized: they are explanatory and often predictive. 
 
The important element of GTM is the analysis, not necessarily the data itself.  
Strauss & Corbin (Strauss, 1990) state: 
 
Concepts are the Basic Units of Analysis.   A theorist 
works with conceptualizations of the data, not the actual data per 
se.  Theories can’t be built with actual incidents or activities as 
observed or reported; that is, from “raw data.”  The incidents, 
events, and happenings are taken as, or analyzed as potential 
indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual 
labels…  As the researcher encounters other incidents, and when 
after comparison to the first, they appear to resemble the same 
phenomena, then these, too, can be labeled (in the same way).  
Only by comparing incidents and naming like phenomena with the 
same term can a theorist accumulate the basic units for theory. 
 
Figure 19 illustrates this cycle.    In GTM, samples are analyzed until all the 
categorizations and properties are validated.   
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Figure 19.  The analysis cycle of GTM (Lehmann, p. 5). 
Research Design 
We applied GTM to the research questions posed in Chapter 1.   Using this 
methodology, the workflow associated with the research is presented in Figure 20.   
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Figure 20.  Experiment Workflow 
Identification of the elements of security policy and the elements of story have 
been conducted as part of the preliminary research for this experiment.  (Carnielli & 
Pittarello, 2009) present a case study to validate story analysis against  the plot of an 
actual novel  addressing the contextual data involved in an autobiograpical story.   
They use the approach defined by (Segre & Kemeney, 1988) which defines four 
levels of narrative analysis: 
 
1. Discourse – the linguistic, stylistic, and metric features of the 
text; 
2. Story – the set of actions as they are presented to the reader by 
the author; 
3. Fabula – the set of actions logically and chronologically 
ordered; 
4. Narrative model—structure characterized by invariants 
common to a set of texts. 
Carnielli and Pittarello apply these levels to create a decision tree of “scenes” 
that define the spatial elements of the physical environment.  “Situations” are a set of 
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actions the user may choose from that will trigger the next set of actions within the 
story (p. 93). 
We propose to apply the narrative structure of Segre and Kemeney in 
conjunction with a story designed to elicit the policy elements required for RAdAC 
access control decisions.   Our objective is to capture the policy elements for use by 
the risk decision element of the RAdAC model.  Figure 21 illustrates the RAdAC 
model, with the policy elements to be elicited highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 21.  RAdAC model, with policy elements highlighted. 
Table 2 presents the definitions of these elements from (Government, Global 
Information Grid Information Assurance Reference Capabilities Document, 2004 p. 
3-15). 
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Table 2.  Risk Attributes of RAdAC Model 
Attribute Definition 
Characteristics of people who create and 
consume information 
Unique identifier, citizenship, security 
clearance level, source, organization, 
community of interest membership(s), 
rank, length of service, job title, system 
privileges, operational position 
Characteristics of IT Components that 
create information and enable people, 
applications, or services to create, share, 
or use information 
Unique device identifier, operating 
system, hardware features, owning 
organization, network connectivity, 
location, certified system administrator, 
current system certification 
Characteristics of Soft objects such as 
files or databases that are shared 
Data, applications, services, identifier, 
sensitivity level, releasability, protection 
quality, source, originator, intended usage 
Environmental factors 
Physical location, adversarial threat level, 
operational need 
Situational factors 
National, enterprise wide, or local 
indicators of a situational condition such 
as the threat level associated with a 
particular type of attack (cyber, terrorist, 
nuclear) 
Heuristics 
Knowledge acquired from past sharing 
and access decisions such as 
characteristic profiles for all other 
factors, plus weighting factor in the 
overall access decision. 
Identification of Complex Systems for Experimentation 
 The next step in the experimental process is the selection of complex system 
architectures that can be subject to analysis.  In the book Thinking in Systems, 
Donella H. Meadows defines a system as “an interconnected set of elements that is 
coherently organized in a way that achieves something….a system must consist of 
three kinds of things:  elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose” (2008, 
p. 11). (Meadows, 2008)  Complex systems apply various enforcement mechanisms 
to enforce a comprehensive security policy.  For example, a cloud-based system 
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might employ firewalls, routers, directory services, and various application 
mechanisms to enforce a security-as-a-service architecture.    For the purposes of this 
set of experiments subject matter experts on the given system(s) and their policy 
enforcement mechanisms must be accessible to the researcher.   This will support 
validation of the story and the narrative requirements statements.    With the policy 
attributes and story components identified, selection of the systems was the next 
critical item in the process.    Three distinct system architectures were selected for 
experimentation. 
 Architecture 1 is an enterprise mail infrastructure.    It supports a global 
Fortune 500 company with over 15,000 mail clients deployed.   This infrastructure is 
used to support both internal and external electronic mail, and is directly connected to 
the Internet.   Figure 22 illustrates the enterprise mail infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Representative enterprise e-mail architecture. 
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Architecture 2 is a network infrastructure responsible for connecting over 15,000 
individual sites for a mission critical systems control application.    In this 
architecture, the network device health and status information is segregated from the 
device data streams.  That is, information on the health of the network and its 
connections is transmitted to a management node, while information used by the 
network applications is transmitted to analytical nodes for processing and 
visualization.  Figure 23 illustrates this architecture. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Network Infrastructure Architecture for 14,000-site network topology. 
The third system architecture is an enterprise services architecture that crosses 
from a secure domain to an untrusted domain in a publish-subscribe model.    
Architecture 3 reflects the circumstance where an information provider wishes to 
make data products available to the public, but wants to make absolutely certain that 
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the subscribers cannot “reach back” into the enterprise intranet and extract additional 
unauthorized data.   Figure 24 illustrates the system architecture for this system. 
 
 
Figure 24.   System architecture for one-way publish-subscribe message broker. 
Identification of Data Inputs and Classification 
 Planned data inputs for the experiment consisted of: 
 
1. The story narratives designed to address the attributes of risk adaptive 
access control policies.  Story narratives will be written with the 
assistance of system subject matter experts.   These subject matter experts 
will review the security policy defined in the narrative to correct any 
errors in policy statement. 
2. A requirements specification addressing the attributes of risk adaptive 
access control policies.  Requirements statements will be written with the 
assistance of system subject matter experts.   These subject matter experts 
will review the requirements statements to correct any omissions in the 
policy requirements specification. 
3. Comprehension questions developed to assess the reader’s understanding 
of the policy.  To eliminate author bias, the questions will be 
independently developed by a security subject matter expert with no 
knowledge of the overall experiment. 
4. Demographic questions for the experiment participants.  These questions 
will address age, computer system usage, general occupation, and years of 
experience.  The demographic questions are for classification purposes 
only; they will not be used to identify the subjects by name. 
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A trial experiment was conducted with a small group of cooperative subjects, 
in these cases members of the local Information System Security Association (ISSA) 
chapter.   Using the planned data inputs proved problematic in a group setting; some 
subjects simply decided to leave early, and chose not of participate.   Others wanted 
to debate potential responses as if the survey was a certification exam.   Further, some 
subjects got lost in reading a one page narrative  and lost interest.   This experience 
led to adjustments to the original plan to facilitate data coding.    
Finding a sufficiently sized group that would not be considered biased by 
virtue of their employer made it simpler to conduct the survey online anonymously.   
Anonymity of survey participants was protected by not asking for names and not 
tracking IP addresses of participants. 
A standard set of demographic questions was developed, to accommodate 
analysis both on an aggregate experiment level and at the level of architecture 
description, either narrative or requirements based. 
A standard set of definitional questions was developed for the same reason, 
and also facilitated a common understanding of the terminology. 
Finally, instead of a single consolidated story narrative, a selection of brief, 
one paragraph scenarios were used.   These were designed to accommodate a short 
user attention span, and were matched with requirements specification language that 
reflected approximately the same scenario. 
This completed the inputs to the experiments, and provided the framework for 
data categorization and subsequent analysis of the results. 
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Sampling 
To conduct the research involved, three distinct research samples were 
developed.    These research samples are all purposeful (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012).  
The candidates selected are used to determine the cognitive value of using the 
security policy story.   Three samples are employed, one for each of the complex 
system architectures used as data inputs.  The sample subjects were made familiar 
with the same complex system architecture for each experiment.    
Sampling Strategy 
Sample personnel were originally planned to be the application user community 
that relies upon the given complex system. These personnel are the end users of the 
complex system architecture.   To the sample personnel, the devices used to create the 
actionable data displayed on their monitors are transparent.  Sample participants met 
the following basic criteria: 
• Have at least 1year of experience as an end user of the system. 
• Possess positions requiring use of the system on a daily basis. 
Unfortunately, the communities of system users available for this experiment could 
have potentially been biased by virtue of their employers.    In one of the scenarios, 
the users could have been the organization that operates the system.   In another, the 
sample population would have been consumers of the system.   To avoid these biases, 
an adjustment was made to the original plan:  instead of using known populations, a 
more random population of subjects was solicited.    The survey instrument was made 
available in two Linked In user communities:   The CyberWarfare User Community 
and the DIACAP/FISMA/5800.2 authorization and approval community.    These 
communities were selected because they have large membership populations (over 
1,000 members each) and are fairly active (usually 5-10 different message threads 
have posts daily). 
       
 
 
 89 
Research Design 
The research was designed as a series of three experiments, one that matches 
each of the complex system architectures identified as data inputs to the research.   
Each experiment followed the same experiment protocol.  
Preliminary Trial 
Prior to conducting the three experiments, a preliminary trial was conducted 
with a smaller sample set of subjects.   The purpose of the preliminary trial is to 
ensure the directions are clear and that the subjects are not confused by the 
instructions or the questions.   The preliminary trial used a simple architecture of a 
print server on a local area network segment.   Only authorized users within a given 
range of office space are allowed to print on the print server.   The preliminary trial 
was expected to find and resolve any ambiguities in the questions and the instructions 
prior to initiating the complex architecture experiments.   As was discussed above, 
several areas of the experiment were refined as a result of lessons learned during the 
preliminary trial. 
Experiment 1 – Enterprise Messaging Architecture 
Knowledge Workers/Participants 
Participants in the study were a group of 50 Information Technology Users.   
This number of users is consistent with the sample size used in (Carnielli, 2009), 
which used a single sample of 35 users for one experiment.   These engineers were 
recruited via announcement in the Linked In communities.     The surveys were 
created in SurveyMonkey™, a survey design and analysis environment that allows 
creation of multiple choice and short completion surveys and provides a hosting 
platform for population surveys as services based computing application. 
The subjects may have security policy implementation knowledge, but 
probably have not derived an information security policy.   That is, if required, the 
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security policy to be implemented in their normal job function is one that has been 
provided to them.   For example, they have implemented specific firewall rules, but 
have not had to derive the rules from network traffic analysis.   The participants may 
have been responsible for device security configuration, which includes applying 
vendor patches, vulnerability scanning on a routine basis, and password management 
of administrative accounts.    
Experiment Design 
 Experiment participants were provided with one of the two narratives:  either 
a story-based security narrative or a requirements specification narrative.   Both 
narratives reflected the same system architecture.   The subjects were asked to read 
the narrative, and then take a brief survey.    The survey consisted of demographic 
questions to facilitate subject classification, definitional questions to ensure a 
common understanding, and security policy questions developed to test their 
comprehension of the policy narrative. 
Training  
The study participants did not require training.   The questions answered after 
reading the narrative were multiple choice categorizations or brief answer, similar to 
the questions asked in a traditional marketing survey or academic testing 
environment. 
After the data collection session, the results from the experiment were 
analyzed.   The two groups (requirements specification and story narrative) were 
compared to determine which narrative provided a more understandable (or 
memorable) security policy statement.  
Experiments 2 and 3 
  Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted in the same fashion as Experiment 1.   
The difference is that these experiments were conducted with different complex 
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system architectures.   By varying the system architectures applied to the 
experiments, any existing knowledge bias should have been eliminated because it is 
highly unlikely that the same subject sample would have prior knowledge of all three 
architectures.   Sample sizes were identical for each experiment, and were divided 
between the requirements specification narrative and the story narrative. 
Instrument Development and Validation 
There were 6 experimental instruments developed.  All instruments shared a 
common set of demographic and definitional questions, designed to facilitate coding 
of the populations.    Each of the three system architectures required two system 
descriptions, one in narrative format and one in requirements specification format.     
Each system architecture was tested against a 50 subject population group, 
with 25 participants receiving the narrative and 25 participants receiving the 
requirements specification language.    The original plan was to randomly select 
subjects for each group until the population was full, and then begin populating the 
next system architecture.    Unfortunately, Survey Monkey does not permit the notion 
of connected surveys.    The experimenter had to monitor the response count, and 
change the survey link manually when the maximum subject threshold was reached 
for a given instrument. 
Formats for Presenting Results 
Results from the experiments were subject to categorization and open coding 
of results.   Initial coding applied demographic information gathered from the 
participants to determine correlations between the participant’s level of expertise and 
the accuracy of the resulting narrative.    The initial code rubric was a simple matrix 
of  the number of iterations and the types (minor/major) of clarifications required as a 
result of the iteration. 
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The 3 experiments were executed with 50 people each, divided into 2 groups 
per experiment, for a total sample size of 150 participants.   Results from the 
preliminary trial were not included in the experimental analysis.  
Aggregate results of the experiment are presented as trending analysis data 
and summary tabular information in Section 4.   Best presentation mechanisms were 
determined as the results and experiments were refined throughout the analytical 
process. 
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
The resources required to complete this experiment are minimal:  a single 
personal computer for data preparation and result correlation.   Items to be prepared 
include the data collection forms, the requirements narrative and the story narrative.   
Data collection forms were created using Microsoft Word and transferred to the 
Survey Monkey℠ platform to generate the survey instrument.  The requirements 
specification narrative was created using traditional specification language samples 
such as those provided in NIST 800-53 (NIST, 2013).    The story was created with 
Microsoft Word, after experimentation with Inspiration, an author’s outlining toolkit, 
or the Writer’s Dream Kit, an alternative story development environment.  Ultimately 
the story creation environment was a function of personal preference.   Someone less 
familiar with requirements definition and narrative might have been perfectly happy 
using Inspiration or the Writer’s Dream Kit.    All of these tools were accessible to the 
experiment designer. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the experimental discussion has presented an overview of the 
issues associated with security policy specification and logical correspondence.  
Given that security policies have become more expressive with additional constraints 
and rule-based capabilities, reaching the eventual binary access control decision has 
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become a more complex task.   Additionally, the need to provide dynamic security 
policies in the event of cyber attack scenarios means policy modifications must be 
rapidly propagated throughout an infrastructure.  This does not leave time  to resolve 
security policy conflicts when an entire mission critical network may be 
compromised. 
We present an alternative approach, specifying security policy through 
storytelling.   Stories provoke discussion, help our collective memory recall the 
success or failure of past policy attempts, and encourage alternative solutions.   As 
security policies become more robust in their emulation of the “real world, “ it will 
become more difficult to prove logical soundness with existing formal methods.   
Given that the ability to perform natural language processing is improving, it may be 
more feasible to perform policy analysis through the use of narratology.   The use of 
computer-assisted narrative for policy management is an area that has not been 
explored to date. 
Further research in ontologies and natural language authoring environments 
needs to be conducted to determine if policies can be expressed and analyzed with 
these capabilities.   Mankind shares a common social history in story; our cultural 
differences change the context.   As our social media converges in the global 
communications network, it will be interesting to determine if our stories and our 
policies converge as well. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the data analysis and research results of the experiment.  
Recall, from Chapter 3, the objective of our experiment was to prove our hypothesis, 
that the security policy elements required to implement complex security meta-
policies can be best expressed as story or narrative elements, which can be 
decomposed into sub-policies and system requirements.  We have chosen to use the 
Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) to validate the hypothesis, and designed our 
experiment to collect data to further facilitate our information coding.   Bloomberg 
and Volpe (2012) illustrate the data analysis process in Figure 24 (p. 140). 
 
Figure 25 The Qualitative Data Analysis Process mapped to data transformations and 
dissertation chapters. 
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Data Analysis 
Strauss and Corbin  (Strauss, 1990) have identified seven criteria as a 
guideline to determine the quality of a grounded theory study.   The applicability of 
the criteria to the data analysis is presented in the following sections. 
Criterion Number One:   how was the original sample selected?   
The original sample was selected from local security practitioners in the Melbourne, 
Florida area.    However, the consideration of sample bias was raised because most of 
the practitioners work for a single employer.    To mitigate this bias, an alternate 
sample was selected.    Linked In℠ is a popular professional social networking site 
that supports the notion of communities of interest.    A notice was posted in two of 
these communities of interest:  the Cyber Warfare Community of Interest and the 
DIACAP/FISMA/FEDRAMP Authorization and Approval Community of Interest.  
These groups were used because they are large communities of users, with over 1000 
users each.  The notice is illustrated in Figure 25. 
Call for participation: 
 
A graduate student at Nova Southeastern University is conducting a survey on access 
control policy specification.    Participation consists of answering survey questions.   
The survey will take no more than 25 minutes of your time for all portions of the 
survey.    All responses are anonymous.  If you have any questions or concerns, 
please contact hronda@nova.edu.    Please click on the following link to participate in 
this research project:  www.surveymonkey.com/XYZ  
 
Figure 26.   Participation Solicitation Notice. 
The criteria for sample selection were straightforward:  if a candidate clicked on the 
survey and provided consent the candidate was added to the sample.   When a given 
survey was full, the solicitation was modified to reflect the next sample group, until 
the full 150-subject sample was completed.    The candidates were purely random and 
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anonymous.   The only common element was that they were members of the 
appropriate community of interest.     
Criterion Number Two:  What major categories emerged? 
The major categories had begun emerging in the literature survey, particularly 
in the discussions of security policy and computer assisted storytelling.    From the 
various security policy formalisms, the notion of subjects, objects, and actions has 
become an accepted standard practice.     That is, subjects are uniquely identified 
users or processes acting on the behalf of user.    Objects are data files, or containers, 
that reflect computing resources available to the user.    Actions are explicit acts, or 
instructions, that are conducted upon data containers, such as read, write, copy, and 
delete operations.    
From the computer assisted storytelling realm, the concept of principal actors, 
actions, and catalysts emerged.    Principal actors can be considered the primary 
characters in a story.   Actions become the activities the principal actor engages in 
over the course of the story, and catalysts become the motivating factors that modify 
the activities.   For example, in Miguel Cervantes’ Don Quixote, the Don is the 
primary character, and he engages in a series of somewhat misguided quests over the 
course of the story.   Finally, at the end of the story, the Don has the revelation that 
his actions have been misguided, and his actions are altered to reflect this change in 
perception. 
These major categories were applied to the creation of the survey instrument.    
For clarity, the instrument was divided into a definitional component and a situational 
component.    The definitional component was identical for both the narrative and the 
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requirements-based situational components.    This was a refinement from the trial 
administration, where the experiment subjects raised explicit questions about 
contextual information and environmental dependencies. 
Given that the comprehensive set of security controls in NIST 5800.4 (U.S. 
Government, 2013) is well over 250 pages of text, a single family of security controls 
was used as the basis for the survey instrument, the family of access control.   This 
selection was made to align with the initial coding of security policy models and 
computational narrative constructs.   A comprehensive survey instrument that 
addressed the entire family of access control requirements would have been 
prohibitively long for a voluntary participation survey.    Further, creation of a 
narrative scenario would have become a small novel, challenging the subject’s 
reading comprehension and attention span.   
The thought of asking the subject to create a “security story” was also 
considered, but was discarded.   While the human brain is wired to accept narrative 
information, it is not a universal talent to create and tell a story.    Rather than bias the 
study with the possibility of bad prose from subjects who could not write, or force the 
subject to use unfamiliar authoring environments, the experiment became a 
comparative assessment of comprehension between a traditional requirements 
specification and small security vignettes.
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Criterion 3:  What were some of the events, incidents, actions and so on, (as 
indicators) that pointed to some of these major categories? 
The major categories of coding were extracted primarily from categorizations 
that were made within the context of security policies (subjects, objects, actions) and 
the context of narrative components (characters, circumstances, actions).  In the 
domain of security policies, earlier policy models were limited to <subject, object, 
action> triples.   Over time, subjects and objects were further refined with specific 
security-relevant attributes.  For example, classification of the data container and the 
clearance of the subject were the earliest security relevant attributes incorporated into 
the security policy domain (Bell, D. & LaPadula, L. 1976).    The most robust model 
defined to date is that of risk-adaptive access control (RaDAC) (McGraw, 2004), 
where various attributes affect the security policy and the user’s access is modified 
based on the values of these attributes.   For example: a user’s access may depend on 
the time of day, which type of device is being used, and where a user is located.    
Data that can be accessed when the user is on the corporate campus may not be 
accessible from a smart phone or tablet device when the user is on an airplane.    This 
evolutionary refinement of the respective disciplines influenced the coding of data as 
the study progressed.
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Criterion 4:  On the basis of what categories did theoretical sampling 
proceed?   Guide data collection?   Was it representative of the categories? 
Theoretical sampling was guided by three distinct requirements:    
1. A need to collect demographic information about the survey respondents, to 
allow categorization of the sample. 
2. A need to establish common definitional terms, or to at least provide 
respondents the opportunity to agree or disagree with the terminology applied 
in the study. 
3. A need to support comparative analysis of narrative discourse and 
requirements specification. 
These requirements influenced the data collection process, in that they shaped the 
data questionnaires as defined in Appendices C-J.   The author defined the use of a 
narrative discourse or a requirements specification as the independent variable of the 
experiment, as it was the only section of the questionnaire that was not identical 
across all populations.             
Criterion 5:  What were some of the hypotheses pertaining to conceptual relations 
(that is, among categories) and on what grounds were they formulated and tested? 
At the highest level, our hypothesis was that it was feasible to define a top-
level narrative-based security policy that can (a) support a significant degree of 
formalism; (b) accommodate verification of completeness and  (c) traceability to 
lower-level functional system specifications.  The research objective is the definition 
of the logical security principles that comprise the system security policy such that: 
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(a)  they can govern system behavior,  
(b) are enforceable throughout the system design process, 
(c) and are comprehensible to the system stakeholders.  
Security policy research has usually been based upon the ability to 
accommodate verification of completeness and traceability to low-level functional 
system specifications through the use of formal methods and logical proof (Bell, D. 
E., 2005).   Unfortunately, most users of computer systems do not have degrees in 
formal logic, and have not proven a theorem since high school geometry.   To 
facilitate logical correctness, the author hypothesized that a grammatically sound 
English sentence could be used to communicate the concepts of subjects, objects, 
actions, and attributes to the end user.  In many systems today, the end user is left to 
their own devices when establishing a security policy for an application or a given 
device.   For example, Internet access to private residences does not come with 
caveats to enable wireless access protection through encryption, thereby allowing the 
entire neighborhood to piggyback on a single user’s connection.   Personal computers 
brought the Defense Information System Network (DISN) to its knees when military 
personnel brought work home on USB drives and unknowingly brought malicious 
code back to the office on Monday morning.     
Our data collection activities addressed these issues by comparing the 
requirements defined in traditional requirements specifications with narrative 
discourse designed to present scenarios where access could be granted or denied.    
The objective was to explain the policy implementation within the context of 
everyday communication and language, not within the confines of symbolic logic and 
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set theory mathematics.    Oftentimes the only way to extract policy rules for a 
complex system is to define usage scenarios, present them to the user community, and 
hope for consensus on the resulting behavior. 
Criterion 6:  Were there instances when hypotheses did not hold up against what was 
actually seen? 
In a perfect world, the state of the art in all research areas for an 
interdisciplinary study such as this one would be sufficiently mature to accommodate 
the hypotheses at hand.    Unfortunately, the world is not perfect.    While we can 
express security policy in terms of subjects, objections, actions, and attributes, we 
cannot have both formalism and functional information systems.    While some 
improvement in theorem proving technology has been made over the last 20 years, 
the feasibility of proving code bases of over 1 million lines of code is still beyond the 
state of the art.     
Similarly, computer-assisted storytelling is very much in its infancy.    While 
the research community understands the components of a story-telling computer, our 
ability to develop an ontology accommodating the vast nature of human language is 
somewhat lacking.     There have been attempts to apply neuroscience to understand 
how a human catalogs experiences and develops comprehension, but the ability to 
accurately measure and monitor these capabilities is just emerging into the 
mainstream research community.    The computer-generated stories of today are of 
the “See Spot.  See Spot run.” variety: simplistic and lacking the rich contextual 
background that should accommodate concepts such as RaDAC.   When these areas 
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were discovered in the course of the research, they were noted and documented in this 
dissertation. 
Criterion 7:  How and why was the core category selected (sudden, gradual, difficult, 
easy)?   On what grounds? 
The core category of this research was selected gradually, over time, and with 
some difficulty.  Conceptually, the notion of a security policy being understandable is 
quite simple.   Our society has standards for sharing, and not sharing, information that 
have not quite become as soundly established in the realm of cyberspace.   
Understanding the sociological basis of story and how the human brain is designed to 
comprehend narrative story was an emerging interdisciplinary process.    Defining 
security policy in the context of storytelling became less complex when the 
categorizations of story structure and components were aligned with the structure of 
security policy. 
Findings   
Bloomberg and Volpe (2012) state: 
You, the researcher, are the storyteller.  Your goal is to tell a story 
that should be vivid and interesting while accurate and credible.   In your 
report, the events, the people, and their words and actions are made explicit 
so the reader can experience the situation as real in a similar way to the 
researcher and experience the world of the participants. (p 148) 
 
To that end, the population for this study was drawn from two LinkedIn℠ 
communities of interest:  the CyberWarfare community and the 
DIACAP/FISMA/FEDRAMP community.   Both of these communities have large 
subscriber bases of active practitioners in   the field of cyber security.  The 
demographics of the survey population can be found in Appendix K.    For the 
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purposes of this study, there was no statistically significant difference among the 
subjects’ basic background that would skew the results relative to interpretation of a 
requirements based system specification or a story-based specification.   
From a demographic perspective, the average survey respondent has been 
working in the security field from 8-10 years, has at least a Bachelor’s degree, and 
works in civil government, technology, or the aerospace industry.    Forty percent (60 
of the 150 respondents) hold at least one security certification, the most common 
being the Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP).   Twenty 
percent of the respondents are involved in system authorization and approval.   Given 
the Federal Government’s tiered model of certifications and years of experience 
acceptable for various career levels, these demographics are not remarkable. 
 Part Two of the survey provided definitional context to address security policy 
definitions.     These five questions were designed to eliminate ambiguity in the 
context of access control.    Subjects were asked to agree or disagree with the 
definition, and provided the opportunity to comment on their answers.   Prior to the 
first question, the questions were caveated with the following paragraph: 
“There are several types of access controls that can be used in cyberspace.   We are 
not concerned with physical access controls for this research project, but with access 
controls in information systems.”    This caveat was incorporated into the survey to 
make it clear that the research was not about physical access management to a 
computer facility or data center, but about the access management that occurs within 
a computer system. 
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 In general, the subject population agreed with the definitions as written.    This 
is not surprising, since the terms and their definitions came from known, generally 
accepted glossaries of terminology such as the NIST Information Assurance 
Glossary.  The percentage of each population group that agreed or disagreed with the 
respective definitions is illustrated in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
Table 3.   Definitional Question Results:  Discretionary Access Control 
Discretionary Access Control is a type of access control that restricts access to objects based on the 
identity of the subjects or groups to which the subjects belong.   The access controls are discretionary 
because subjects with certain privileges are capable of passing those privileges to any other subjects, 
either directly or indirectly.   Do you agree or disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please 
comment.	  
Percentage of Respondents Replying 
 Arch. 1–R Arch. 1-N Arch. 2-R Arch. 2-N Arch.3-N Arch.3-R 
Agree 75 80 80 85 85 90 
Disagree 25 20 20 15 15 10 
 
Those that disagreed with the definition of discretionary access control commented 
about restricting access to objects based on the user’s identity, given that the 
definition did not specify a unique user identity.    Another comment was that “certain 
privileges” was ambiguous, especially if those privileges allowed the passing of 
access rights to others.    An example was given of passing access to a member of a  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country, in that granting access to one 
country member of NATO usually means the entire Allied Forces would have access 
by the next day.   Those that disagreed wanted a more explicit definition of the term 
to avoid ambiguity. 
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 Table 4 presents the results of the definitional question about execution 
domains.    As defined in the NIST Information Assurance Glossary, a domain is the 
cross product of the resources and users defined by the system security policy.    For 
example, a trusted domain can be defined as the domain of intranet users, and an 
untrusted domain would be the set of extranet users.    The trusted domain is defined 
by the access control boundary of an organization, for example, a firewall that is at 
the intranet/extranet boundary.     
Table 4.   Definitional Question Results:  Domain 
A domain is an environment or context that includes a set of system resources and a set of system 
entities that have the right to access the resources as defined by a common security policy, security 
model, or security architecture.  Do you agree or disagree with this definition?  If you disagree, please 
comment. 
Percentage of Respondents Replying 
 Arch. 1–R Arch. 1-N Arch. 2-R Arch. 2-N Arch.3-N Arch.3-R 
Agree 80 75 85 90 85 95 
Disagree 20 25 15 10 15 5 
 
Again, there was general agreement on the domain definition.   There was some 
disagreement on the use of security policy or security model as the boundary 
definition; in that the terminology was not as explicitly specified as it would be in a 
security architecture.   This would be a case where the subject may have been seeking 
less ambiguity in the definition, in which case the lower level of abstraction would be 
preferred.    
 Table 5 presents the results from the definitional question of Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC).   This question generated the greatest consensus, with over 
ninety percent of the respondents agreeing with the definition as stated.    A large 
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percentage of the subject population is employed in the government and/or 
technology fields, where RBAC is widely used to facilitate system administration 
activities. 
 
Table 5.   Definitional Question Results:  Role Based Access Control 
Access control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of access authorizations a user receives based on 
an implicit or explicit assumption of a given role).  Role permissions may be inherited through a role 
hierarchy and typically reflect the permissions needed to perform defined functions within an 
organization.  A given role may apply to a single individual or to several individuals.  Do you agree or 
disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please comment. 
Percentage of Respondents Replying 
 Arch. 1–R Arch. 1-N Arch. 2-R Arch. 2-N Arch.3-N Arch.3-R 
Agree 90 95 85 90 95 95 
Disagree 10 5 15 10 5 5 
 
 Table 6 summarizes the definitional question on the term security policy 
model.  This question generated the greatest disagreement percentages among the 
participants.   Comments received on this definition were that the subject did not 
understand flow control, and that “other aspects of information security policy” 
should have been explicitly stated.   The author believes the issue may be that a 
security policy model is usually an early system design artifact, and that several 
system architectures essentially reuse existing security policy models.  Tailoring of 
abstract security policy models such as the Bell-LaPadula Model (Bell, D. &   
LaPadula, L., 1976) is considered a detailed design activity at a lower level of 
abstraction.    
An alternative explanation may be found in the interpretation of the 
demographics of the population.    Approximately 15 percent of the population 
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characterized itself as a security architect; another 15 percent consider themselves 
security engineers.   That means 30 percent of the population routinely address 
system design and requirements as part of their assigned duties.   The remaining 
population functions as security analysts, security operations personnel, and system 
administrators.   In these job categories, the employee is responsible for the actual 
implementation of the security policy on given devices, such as firewalls, routers, and 
servers, or is responsible for locating policy breaches and reverse engineering these 
activities.   As such, they are not usually concerned with the soundness of the policy 
model, but with the enforcement of the model as translated through the design 
abstractions. 
Table 6.   Definitional Question Results:  Security Policy Model 
An abstraction representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity with respect to 
safeguarding information; typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers, 
files), within the information system and used to enable the implementation of access control and flow 
control policies, reflect special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions, or support other 
aspects of the information security policy.  Do you agree or disagree with this definition? If you 
disagree, please comment. 
Percentage of Respondents Replying 
 Arch. 1–R Arch. 1-N Arch. 2-R Arch. 2-N Arch.3-N Arch.3-R 
Yes 70 75 65 70 80 75 
No 30 25 35 30 20 25 
 
Table 7 summarizes the findings on Mandatory Access Controls.   There was minimal 
disagreement on the definition of mandatory or non-discretionary access controls.   
Comments made by the survey subjects asked for more explicit definitions of an 
authorized user and/or what was considered an access control.   For example, if a user 
fails an identification and authentication challenge, this could be considered a form of 
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mandatory access control, in that the system would not necessarily allow the user to 
perform an activity.   The example was provided of Amazon allowing anyone to 
browse the on-line store, but only an authenticated user being allowed to purchase 
merchandise. 
Table 7.   Definitional Question Results:  Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory Access Controls or Non-discretionary access controls are access controls imposed by the 
information system that cannot be altered without explicit action from an authorized user.  Do you 
agree or disagree with this definition? If you disagree, please comment. 
Percentage of Respondents Replying 
 Arch. 1–R Arch. 1-N Arch. 2-R Arch. 2-N Arch.3-N Arch.3-R 
Agree 85	   80	   90	   90	   85	   80	  
Disagree 15	   20	   10	   10	   15	   20	  
  
As in the definitional results presented in Table 6, the results for Table 7 may have 
more to do with the job functions of the respondents than their understanding of the 
terms.    Operators and administrators do not usually think about policy as mandatory 
or discretionary; policy is policy and is enforced by the system.    Especially at the 
less experienced career levels, the security policy is mostly an abstraction, a design 
concept and definition that is memorized for industry certification exams.    There is 
very little thought about policy until one is asked to derive a policy based upon the 
documentation provided by a client, which in most organizations is an activity 
conducted by a security architect or a system security engineer. 
Narrative v. Requirements Specification 
The third and final section of the survey instrument addresses the question of 
traditional requirements specification language compared to narrative requirements.  
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For the purposes of comparison, Table 8 presents the two sets of specifications for 
Architecture 1 in their entirety side by side. 
Table 8.   Architecture 1, Requirements Specification v. Narrative Language 
Requirements Specification Language Narrative Language 
System Description: 
For the next set of questions, the system 
is defined as an enterprise mail 
infrastructure.   It supports a global 
Fortune 500 company with over 15,000 
mail clients deployed.  This infrastructure 
is used to support both internal and 
external electronic mail, and is directly 
connected to the Internet.  For this 
discussion, we are only concerned about 
the access control policy.   The system in 
question is implementing a new type of 
access control, risk adaptive access 
control, which considers the context of 
the system environment to make access 
control decisions. 
 
To send mail, a user shall be a registered 
user in the enterprise. 
A registered user shall be defined as a 
user with a unique identity. 
A registered user shall authenticate to the 
system with an authentication token. 
A mailbox shall be created for all 
registered users of the messaging system. 
The system shall allow for a maximum 
mailbox size of 200 MB. 
A warning message shall be generated if 
the mailbox size exceeds 150 MB. 
When the maximum mailbox size is 
reached, a user shall not be allowed to 
send messages until the mailbox size is 
reduced. 
Approval from the Messaging System 
Administrator shall be required to extend 
the maximum mailbox size beyond 200 
MB. 
System Description: 
For the next set of questions, the system 
is defined as an enterprise mail 
infrastructure.   It supports a global 
Fortune 500 company with over 15,000 
mail clients deployed.  This infrastructure 
is used to support both internal and 
external electronic mail, and is directly 
connected to the Internet.  For this 
discussion, we are only concerned about 
the access control policy.   The system in 
question is implementing a new type of 
access control, risk adaptive access 
control, which considers the context of 
the system environment to make access 
control decisions. 
 
To send mail, a user must be registered in 
the enterprise, and have a unique user 
identity and authentication token as well 
as a mailbox.  This is the non-
discretionary access control policy of the 
messaging system. 
 
When a user joins the company, he is 
issued a unique user account and an 
authentication token so he can access the 
company systems.  A mailbox is also 
created for him.  When a user leaves the 
company, the user account is disabled, 
but the mailbox remains active.   A 
maximum mailbox size is set, and if a 
user exceeds it, they cannot send or 
receive mail.   Administrative assistants 
can send mail on the behalf of managers 
if they have been granted that privilege.   
A department manager travels a lot and 
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A user shall not send mail on the behalf 
of another user. 
A user can function in an administrative 
role and send mail on the behalf of 
another user provided the administrative 
role is bound to both messaging system 
users. 
Messages sent on the behalf of a user 
shall also be sent to the users normally in 
this role, as well as the intended 
recipient. 
The system shall deliver a message 
within 15 minutes of the user hitting 
“send.” 
If the system cannot deliver a message, a 
notice of non-delivery shall be sent to the 
user, with an explanation of why the 
message was not delivered. 
has his administrative assistant read and 
respond to his routine email so he doesn’t 
have to worry about them while he is on 
the road.  The administrator always sends 
a copy of the message to the boss so he 
knows what the message response was.  
The administrative assistant cannot delete 
messages from the manager’s account. 
 
 
Note that in general, the same basic information is conveyed in both variants.    
In the traditional requirements specification language, more specificity about sizes of 
mailbox and delivery times is provided.  In the narrative specification, the 
requirements are less specific, and focus more on the rationale behind the policy, such 
as a manager is on the road and his administrative assistant deals with routine 
correspondence.    
For the purpose of analysis, the questions were divided into smaller segments.     
Segment one addressed the basic access control policy, and whether it was sufficient.    
In the case of the traditional requirements specification subjects, 70 percent of the 
respondents did not consider the requirements to be a minimum sufficient set of 
access controls.   The respondents wanted more specificity:  how a user was 
registered into the system, what qualified as a unique identity, what was an acceptable 
authentication token, and when a user was considered registered.    In contrast, 65 
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percent of the narrative respondents believed the set of requirements was minimally 
sufficient.   The 35 percent that did not consider the requirements to be sufficient 
echoed the comments of the narrative respondents in that more specificity was 
required.     
The requirements specification discussion on maximum size of mailbox 
(Question 14 in the survey) was considered a valid set of requirements for a 
messaging system.   Some commented on the inclusion of a role based access control 
mechanism incorporated into this question, in that approval from the Messaging 
System Administrator was required if the maximum mailbox size needed to be 
increased.  In the narrative specification, the majority of respondents considered the 
narrative a sufficient set of access control requirements.   
Questions 15, 16, and 17 were considered control questions.   The same 
question was asked in both versions of the survey instrument.    Question 15 resulted 
in 80 percent of respondents selecting the answer “no messages can be sent or 
received.”    This is the correct response based upon the information presented.   
Question 16 asks how many messages are sent when the administrative assistant 
sends a message for the department manager.    The information provided indicates a 
correct answer is two, one to the recipient and one to the department manager.   In 
reality, 35 percent of the respondents selected the answer that three messages were 
sent, citing the retention of a message in the administrative assistants’ sent items 
mailbox.  It should be noted that not all mail systems maintain a sent items mailbox. 
The last question in this survey posed an interesting challenge to the 
respondents:  “A user leaves the organization.  Can the user still send email?”    85 
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percent of the narrative respondents said the user could not send email, because the 
user would not be registered within the enterprise.   The requirements specification 
respondents did not agree, and 50 percent found the question ambiguous.    The user 
could still send email, simply not from that email system within the enterprise.   
There were no restrictions on his ability to send email from alternative accounts, such 
as a personal email account.     
The second survey architecture represents a network infrastructure, a 
considerably more complex system architecture example.   While most system users 
are quite familiar with electronic mail, fewer understand how network infrastructure 
delivers packets, and how many defensive mechanisms are employed to reduce the 
probability of a successful attack.  Table 9 presents the alternate specifications. 
Table 9:  Alternate Specifications, Network Infrastructure 
Requirements Specification Narrative Specification 
For the next section, the system in 
question is a network infrastructure.  The 
network infrastructure is responsible for 
connecting over 15,000 individual sites 
for a mission critical system control 
application.  The network terminates at 
the service delivery point, which is 
similar to the cable service provider 
termination at a personal residence. 
Network device health and status 
information shall be segregated from the 
user data within the network. 
The network and security management 
node shall enforce the concept of least 
privilege. 
Two man control (security and network 
administrators) shall be required to add a 
component to the infrastructure:  no one 
person can completely register a device 
on the network and configure it. 
For the next section, the system in 
question is a network infrastructure.   The 
network infrastructure is responsible for 
connecting over 15,000 individual sites 
for a mission critical system control 
application.   In this architecture, the 
network device health and status 
information is segregated from the device 
data streams.   That is, information on the 
health and status of the network is 
transmitted to a management node, while 
information used by the network 
applications is transmitted to analytical 
nodes for processing and visualization.   
The management node enforces least 
privilege and two man controls on the 
infrastructure components; no one person 
can completely register a device on the 
network and configure it.   The networks 
terminate at service delivery points 
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(SDPs) that are not necessarily end user 
servers or workstations. 
 
For this set of analysis, the emphasis was on the notion of two-man control 
and separation of duty policies.   When a security administrator calls in sick, there is 
only one administrator working, a network administrator.   The question is raised as 
to whether the network administrator can completely configure a device and place it 
in operation.    The majority (70%) of respondents said the answer was NO in both 
the narrative and the requirements specification survey instruments.    When the YES 
answer was provided, it was expressed as a special circumstance, such as a device in 
need of repair or replacement on an emergency basis.    It was not a question of 
whether or not the network administrator had the knowledge, it was a question of did 
the network administrator have the permissions to configure the security functions of 
the device.  Upon further analysis, these respondents were almost exclusively security 
operations personnel, those who are responsible for the daily maintenance of a 
system.   In these cases, actual experience outweighed the statement of security 
policy. 
 The next two questions in this survey focused on actual duties performed.   In 
both surveys, 65% of the respondents correctly categorized job functions.    Network 
routing tables are normally considered part of network administration duties, and 
audit log monitoring is part of security administration duties.   Those who selected 
minority answers (that audit logs are part of network administration duties and 
routing table establishment is part of security administration duties) made those 
selections based on their individual experiences.   There are systems where security 
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auditing is not implemented, but OpenFlow traffic monitoring is used to manage 
network bandwidth.  Additionally, there are networks where routing tables are 
considered sensitive information; therefore routing table management could be 
considered a security administration function.   Again, it is more an environmentally 
based answer than an answer that has its basis in written policy. 
 Finally, the question of patch management is presented in the final question 
on this survey instrument.    The simple statement “Vulnerability remediation (patch 
management) fixes vulnerabilities in the infrastructure” is presented.    The subject is 
asked to determine which job function is the best fit for this duty.    Of the 
requirements specification respondents, 70 percent placed vulnerability remediation 
as a security function.    Narrative respondents were less definitive, with 50% 
commenting that the function could be a network administration function, depending 
upon the vulnerability in question.    One could state that the narrative respondents 
took a more collaborative approach to the task than a strict separation of duty model 
would indicate. 
 Finally, we examine the third architecture, a service-oriented architecture with 
a content creator/content subscriber model that crosses a trusted boundary.   The two 
system specifications are presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10. – Alternate Specifications, Publish Subscribe Model. 
Requirements Specification Narrative Specification 
For the next set of questions, the system 
shall support a content creator/content 
subscriber model.   All content created 
within an enterprise shall be stored in a 
data repository.   When new content is 
available, the subscriber shall be notified.   
The information broker validates 
information flow as illustrated in Figure 
23. 
For the next set of questions, the system 
is defined as a content creator/content 
subscriber model.  All content is created 
within an enterprise and stored in a data 
repository.  When new content is 
available, subscribers are notified.  The 
information broker validates that the 
subscriber is within the enterprise, or an 
external subscriber. 
If the subscriber is an external subscriber, 
the information is pushed through a 
firewall and made available on an 
outwardly facing message bus.  No 
information is passed back through the 
firewall to the internal message bus.  An 
external subscriber can collect 
information from the external message 
bus only, and cannot alter the original 
content of the internal message bus 
 
Architecture Three provides the highest degree of complexity, in that there is 
cross-domain information flow between trusted and untrusted subscribers.     In the 
constraints of this study, the respondents that received the requirements specification 
form picked more constrained responses.   For example, when asked how many types 
of subscribers existed, 85 percent of requirements specification respondents picked 
two:  trusted and untrusted.    Of the narrative respondents, there were a higher 
percentage of unknown responses, 45 percent.    The comments were that there was 
not information to determine the types of subscribers, and that more information was 
needed about the content to determine the subscriber type.      
       
 
 
 116 
The remaining questions had a distinct and similar pattern:   the majority of 
narrative respondents (averaging 80% over the four questions) were able to select 
answers to the questions consistent with the security policy described in the narrative.    
One could state that these respondents had the benefit of additional narration that was 
not provided to the requirements specification respondents.    Alternatively, the 
requirements specification respondents had the benefit of a system diagram 
illustrating information flow across the domains.    With the information provided, it 
would appear that the narrative specification respondents were able to more precisely 
place the system security policy within the context of prohibited/allowed user 
behaviors than a system diagram would allow. 
Summary  
In this section, we have discussed the criterion of a grounded theory 
methodology experiment, and illustrated how this experiment conforms to the criteria 
described in (Glaser & Strauss, 1968).   The experiment is not a strict interpretation of 
grounded theory methodology, which, in the constructs of Bloomberg and Volpe 
(2012) , involve small populations, repeated interviews, and shared experiences 
among the population.     Using this strict interpretation of qualitative experiment 
design would have minimized the population size, and sacrificed anonymity of the 
user population.   It also would have proven manpower intensive to perform one-on-
one interviews with 150 experimental subjects. 
The initial experimental objective, that narrative could be applied more 
effectively as a requirements language than traditional specification language was 
successfully illustrated:   as the systems became more complex the narrative 
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specifications appeared to deliver a more precise model of system behavior as defined 
in the narrative specification and derived from the question responses.    The use of an 
anonymous survey as a measuring instrument may lack a preferred depth of data in 
that subjects are not interviewed; the survey does provide sufficient contextual 
information to infer correct user behaviors from the described security policy. 
What does this indicate for the experiment’s hypothesis, that security policies 
can be explained in relatively simple English and explicitly traced to lower-level 
implementations?   It appears that simple English, logically and explicitly described, 
provides a sufficient system requirements specification when compared to traditional 
requirements specification languages.    That is, a top-level narrative can be traced to 
lower level abstractions to define appropriate system activities comparable to the 
policy objectives one would see in a more formal specification language. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter places the experimental findings within the context of current 
research, and presents thoughts for further study. 
Implications 
 Reeder, et al (2007) states: 
Security and privacy management tasks were previously left to expert 
system administrators who could invest the time to learn and use complex 
user interfaces, but now these tasks are increasingly left to end-users.   
Two non-expert groups of policy authors are on the rise.  First are non-
technical enterprise policy authors, typically lawyers or business 
executives, who have the responsibility to write policies governing an 
enterprise’s handling of personal information (Karat, J., Karat C.-M, 
Brodie, C.,  & Feng, J, 2005).   Second are end-users, such as those who 
wish to set up their own spam filters, share files with friends but protect 
them from unwanted access (Cao, X., & Iverson, L, 2006) (Good, N.S. & 
Krekelberg, A., 2003) (Maxion, R.A. & Reeder, R.W., 2005), or share 
shipping information with Web merchants while maintaining privacy 
(Cranor, L.F., Guduru, P., Arjula, J., 2006).  
 
As the use of information systems has spread throughout society, the need for less expert 
policy interfaces has increased.    One can no longer assume that accomplished system 
administrators are formulating policy and propagating its enforcement throughout the 
user’s environment.   Today, a casual information technology user can maintain a 
variety of devices such as smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktops, and file servers to 
support ubiquitous connectivity.    Yet the security policy creation environments across 
these devices are not consistent or user friendly.    Rather, security by obscurity 
continues to be the rule rather than exception.     
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There have been attempts to define structured policy authoring environments.    
LeMay, Fatemieh, and Gunter (2007) state that “many of the challenges that arise 
during the development and maintenance of an access control policy are caused by 
the inability of the policy administrator to correctly translate high-level business 
requirements into low-level access control policies that can be implemented in an 
Access Decision Function (ADF)(p. 205).”   There has also been research on the 
subject of making policy authoring domain friendly, in that different user 
environments use different terminology, with a hierarchy of direction implicit in the 
terms (Johnson, Karat, Karat, Grueneberg).  For example, in the medical profession, 
directions written by a doctor take precedence over those written by a nurse.   While 
these attempts to define and refine policy are useful, they apply a very different 
approach:   one of bottoms-up policy refinement.   That is, security policy is defined 
within the context of the devices and/or applications being used to enforce it.   It is 
not authored as a top-down function of an information system.    While it is useful to 
understand how policy is implemented within a complex system, it is not necessarily 
the best approach to policy when dealing with non-expert system users. 
Our research has taken a top down approach to security policy, treating 
security policy as a top-level system requirement that must be allocated throughout 
the design process.    With a complex system architecture, this is the preferred 
approach to system design, in that functionality is allocated to specific components, 
and, as technology evolves, replacement elements duplicate or improve upon the 
functionality allocated to a specific element. 
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Research to date on policy authoring has addressed hands-on observation of  
20-30 subjects and focused on how the subjects performed the task, what errors they 
commonly made, and how to correct those errors (Johnson, et al, 2010), (Reeder, et. 
al, 2007).   The policy authoring tools developed used constrained language subsets 
or templates manifested as pull-down menus.     
Instead of making the user adapt to a new syntax and subset of language, we 
have chosen to explore the use of traditional English language and the constructs of 
storytelling and narrative decomposition as an alternative.     In our study, we have 
synthesized the ongoing research in neuroscience, computer assisted storytelling, and 
narrative understanding to present a top down approach to security policy.    Further, 
through the application of an adapted grounded theory methodology, we were able to 
do so with a somewhat larger sample of participants than previous studies have 
accommodated. 
 While our sample size was larger, we also had to revise the study protocol to 
adapt to the data delivery method.    To accommodate an on-line survey instrument, 
one must adapt to the user interface conventions of web-based access methods:  
namely, that users do not read long narratives online.    This modification to the 
original experiment design forced the data to be delivered in smaller “vignettes”, 
addressing single topic areas in each question set as opposed to the complex system 
requirements. 
Recommendations 
 There are several areas for research refinement that could be addressed in 
future research. 
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User population description 
One area we would have liked to address is the potential difference in policy 
specification from the casual system user’s perspective.   The subject pool for the 
experiment was a pool of experienced security practitioners:  not a pool of general 
computer users.    This was a question of available and cooperative subjects to 
perform the experiment.   The author had access to security practitioners who had 
practical work experience, and did not have access to a general population of casual 
computer users.    In one respect, this simplified the study, in that the user population 
understood the fundamental concepts of security policy.   On the other hand, this 
complicated the study, because definitional questions were added to ensure all 
practitioners had a relatively common understanding of the terms used in the 
specifications.    A general population of “casual” computer users would be difficult 
to qualify.   With the proliferation of tablet computers, notebooks, “smart phones” 
and gaming devices, a common set of definitions and/or experiences might make the 
demographics and categorization of such a group problematic. 
Further research must be conducted to determine if this type of experiment is 
feasible for the general class of system users with larger sample sizes.   This may be 
the only way to determine if simple security policies can be understood and 
subsequently enforced upon larger user communities.   Locating a collection of 
willing participants that do not reflect a bias because of their employer or student 
status will make selection of such a student pool more difficult.   Such 
experimentation may be better focused in the realm of product manufacturing.   Cell 
phones and tablet computers tailored to the elderly and the preschool markets have 
       
 
 
 122 
begun to come to market.    It would not be far fetched for a more simplistic user 
interface to abstract the operating system’s complexities from the end user:    witness 
the popularity of windows-oriented interfaces over character-based interfaces. 
Description of general user situations 
 The study addressed three distinct system architectures:  enterprise e-mail, 
network infrastructure, and a publish-subscribe cross-domain solution.   These types 
of architectures are representative of the types of general complex system problems 
that exist in current information technology environments.    However, with the 
exception of e-mail, they are not the types of systems that end users encounter every 
day.   Most of the activity in complex system architectures is transparent to the end-
user.  That is, the systems deliver information to the end user subject to the user’s 
operational constraints and the system’s policy enforcement capabilities.    
 The end user does not see the system components of web-based electronic 
purchase transactions such as inventory management, order fulfillment, and payment 
processing.    The results of those functions are delivered to the end user, but are not 
presented in detail.    For example, the user may see a message that a credit card was 
rejected.   The details of the rejection process and its workflow are not presented to 
the end user; only a message to contact the issuing organization is displayed.    
A series of usage scenarios needs to be created to determine the applicability 
of this methodology to the casual system user.   In these cases, the security policy and 
its enforcement is transparent to the system user, who is not provided sufficient 
information to determine why his request was not fulfilled.   While this is deliberate 
to avoid sharing information that could be used to compromise the system, it does 
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distance the user from understanding the role of security policy enforcement.   If the 
user does not understand that a policy exists the user could not be expected to 
understand its enforcement. 
Application of Ontological Based Deconstruction 
As the technologies for natural language have matured, the ontologies that 
support natural language processing have become more robust.   One of the 
constraining functions of computer-assisted storytelling has been the ability of the 
computer to understand the user’s contextual information.   For example, the number 
“42” in most contexts is just a random number; to those who have read “The 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” the number 42 is the meaning of life, the universe, 
and everything.     
With the emergence of large storage area networks, it is possible for 
computers to rapidly search large quantities of data and determine the probability a 
given fact fits a given user context.    For example, when IBM’s Watson architecture 
played Jeopardy!, Watson did extremely well on questions that required rapid fact-
based searches.   It was less successful on questions that required some degree of 
background or contextual information.   This is consistent with security policy 
enforcement as well:   binary answers are easy; answers that depend on a collection of 
circumstances are more difficult to determine. 
 Raskin et al (2001) developed a preliminary ontology of information security 
terms. While this ontology presented a synthesis of cryptographic terms and 
information security terms, it predates a large body of technology and terminology 
that has become commonplace.  For example, tablet computing, notebooks, and cloud 
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computing did not exist at the time the Raskin ontology was created.  As such, the 
development of security-specific ontologies must also address the current and 
emerging technology baseline.  Otherwise, security will continue to be an 
afterthought in the system development process and lag behind in technology 
innovation and acceptance.   
A security specific ontology must address information sharing mechanisms 
and unique user identification and authorization techniques.    Without the language 
constructs to address constrained information sharing, identity management, and 
information provenance, there will be little functional enforcement of theoretical 
policy constructs.   This will become an increasing problem as the “Internet of 
Things” emerges and temporary social media become more prominent in our quest 
for connectedness.   
For example, a given hotel chain may offer a “lobby network” for registered 
guests to help them find dinner partners in a strange town.    Participation in such a 
network may be voluntary, but would only be available to paying guests.   
Specification of the constraints associated with such social information sharing would 
need to address both membership in the group of registered guests and the location of 
the hotel.    When a guest checks out, the hotel must remove his access to the group, 
or remove him from the location after his anticipated stay is over.   Such constraints 
can be gleaned from the user check-in experience, but only if the capability is 
integrated into the guest registration and billing infrastructure. 
As another example, consider the electronic health record.     Today’s medical 
technology allows home-based monitoring of various medical information types that 
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are valuable to the treating physician.    This information can be stored and used to 
create general trending data to adjust medication and treatment plans for patients.   
The devices, the information stored, the patient, and the physician all have some 
access rights to this information.    The question is how to limit those rights within the 
constraints of patient privileged information and patient identity.  As an example, 
there are instances when reporting of infectious diseases such as influenza to public 
health officials is in the interests of the common good, and such data is usually 
reported without patient identification.    Again, definition of the information sharing 
policy must be simple enough to be understood, but complex enough to address the 
potential usage or value chain associated with the information. 
The Transitivity of Security Policy Enforcement 
 One of the key features of a partially ordered set representation of security 
policy is the transitive nature of security policy enforcement.    That is, the results are 
the same if (a + b) + c or if a + (b + c).   As we move towards risk adaptive access 
controls, the chain of variables increases:    (a + b) + (c + d) + e.   As the number of 
variables increases, the results of policy decisions may result in inconsistencies based 
on the order of enforcement or evaluation.    Risk Adaptive Access Control 
mechanisms are just emerging from the research laboratories, and have not been 
implemented in a commercial-off-the-shelf product architecture to date.    More 
experimentation with both the policy representation and the order of evaluation must 
be accomplished with multi-variant security policy logic.   These activities are 
essential as we move towards autonomic systems, where the system is responsible for 
security policy enforcement and takes action without human intervention.   As the 
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Internet of Things (IoT) emerges, sensor networks will incorporate logic to take 
actions when specific threshold values are reached.    In these cases, a system may 
shut down, throttle back production, or decrease network bandwidth based upon the 
programmed policies.     If the results of policy evaluation are not transitive, then the 
failure conditions may not be consistent.    If this is the case, a system may be shut 
down or removed from service based upon false information, or, worst case, lives 
may be lost because the system believed everything was fine.    Experimentation is 
necessary to determine both policy correctness and operational policy implementation 
correctness.    There is considerable room for error between a logical policy model 
and the software that embodies that policy model in an operational system. 
Evolution of Storytelling Technologies 
 In “Do Story Agents Use Rocking Chairs”, Brooks (1996) hypothesized a 
computer-generated storytelling architecture and stated that it was going to take a 
considerable amount of effort to make such a system a reality.    The question of 
automated storytelling has been deconstructed into a series of questions about 
contextual information:  what a given phrase means within a given context and how 
the language is arranged within a sentence.  With the advent of Attribute Based 
Access Control (ABAC) models, we have the capability to describe the access control 
related context of a given object in a standardized context.   What remains to be 
accomplished is the integration of security context with storytelling capabilities to 
determine if the actions are consistent with the user’s intent.   In the non-cyber world 
it is relatively easy to determine if a user has violated access controls:   physical 
alarms go off, there are signs of forced entry, and items are missing.    In the cyber 
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world, data can be missing and the owner may not be aware that it has been taken, or 
worse, altered in some way that would lead to a wrong conclusion.   The complexity 
of system architectures and network infrastructures add to the complexity of security 
policies in that there are that many more devices that have the opportunity to alter the 
security policy or misinterpret it in transit.   For example, an application layer firewall 
may prohibit communication that should be permitted because a particular protocol is 
not supported.   Considerably more research must be conducted in this area to 
determine if a fully automated security policy generation environment can be created. 
Summary  
In conclusion, we have presented the case for policy elicitation through the 
use of structured storytelling as a less intimidating, more descriptive technique that 
would lend itself to contextual security information such as that required for risk 
adaptive access control model.  We believe this would be a more comprehensible 
system security policy definition; one that could elicit the information required for 
various security policy models and supports a degree of formalism that would be 
amenable to formal methods and logical proof if desired.    
 Our review of the literature surveyed a large and diverse set of security 
policies that have formal model as well as several policy authoring tools that explore 
templates, constrained natural languages, and graphical authoring environments.  
Further, we presented a collection of analytical tools to disassemble narrative text and 
story elements into their basic components for textual analysis.   The policies 
discussed are highly formal, the policy authoring environments constrain the users 
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ability to select in syntax and expression, and the narrative analysis tools have not 
been applied to security policies.    
The experimental discussion presented an overview of the issues associated 
with security policy specification and logical correspondence.  Security policies have 
become more expressive with additional constraints and rule-based capabilities, 
which have made reaching the eventual binary access control decision a more 
complex task.   Additionally, the need to provide dynamic security policies in the 
event of cyber attack scenarios means policy modifications must be rapidly 
propagated throughout an infrastructure.  This does not leave time to resolve security 
policy conflicts when an entire mission critical network may be compromised. 
As an alternative approach, we offer the specification of security policy 
through storytelling.   Stories provoke discussion, help our collective memory recall 
the success or failure of past policy attempts, and encourage alternative solutions.   As 
security policies become more robust in their emulation of the “real world, “ it will 
become more difficult to prove logical soundness with existing formal methods.   
Given that the ability to perform natural language processing is improving, it may be 
more feasible to perform policy analysis through the use of narratology.   The use of 
computer-assisted narrative for policy management is an area that has not been 
explored to date. 
Further research in ontologies and natural language authoring environments 
needs to be conducted to determine if policies can be expressed and analyzed with 
these capabilities.   Mankind shares a common social history in story; our cultural 
differences change the context.   As our social media converges in the global 
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communications network, it will be interesting to determine if our stories and our 
policies converge as well. 
Our experiment adapted the qualitative grounded theory methodology to the 
specification of security policies.    We demonstrated correspondence to Glaser and 
Strauss’ criteria for a grounded theory experiment (1968). The experiment is not a 
strict interpretation of grounded theory methodology, which, in the constructs of 
Bloomberg and Volpe (2012), involves small populations, repeated interviews, and 
shared experiences among the population.     Using this strict interpretation of 
qualitative experiment design would have minimized the population size, and 
sacrificed anonymity of the user population.   It also would have proven manpower 
intensive to perform one-on-one interviews with 150 experimental subjects. 
The initial experimental objective, that narrative could be applied more 
effectively as a requirements language than traditional specification language was 
successfully illustrated.   As the system architectures became more complex the 
narrative specifications appeared to deliver a more precise model of system behavior, 
as defined in the narrative specification and derived from the question responses.    
The use of an anonymous survey as a measuring instrument may lack a preferred 
depth of data in that subjects are not interviewed; the survey does provide sufficient 
contextual information about the system to infer correct user behaviors from the 
described security policy.   While system requirements specification language also 
describes system behavior, in our results the requirements specification respondents 
wanted additional detail to remove ambiguity from the requirements. 
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What does this indicate for the experiment’s hypothesis, that security policies 
can be explained in relatively simple English and explicitly traced to lower-level 
implementations?   It appears that simple English, logically and explicitly described, 
can provide a sufficient system requirements specification when compared to 
traditional requirements specification languages.    That is, a top-level narrative can 
be traced to lower level abstractions defining appropriate system activities 
comparable to the policy objectives one would see in a more formal specification 
language. 
In the early stages of this dissertation, the vision was the adaptation of a 
natural language storytelling environment to the creation of security policy.   As the 
research survey continued, it was apparent that machine-assisted storytelling was in 
its infancy.    There are writer’s aids that assist in defining plot and story characters, 
but none that can comprehensively address the dimensions of a security specification.   
Using storytelling to address the nineteen requirements families covered in NIST’s 
Security Controls Catalog would require authoring a large book.    It may be more 
effective to model security policy in a game based simulation, where information 
context can be visualized.   
In today’s computer system environment, security policy can be enforced at 
any point from the user’s device back to the storage area network.    Each device has 
its own syntax, it’s own commands, and it’s own enforcement mechanisms.    The 
integrated totality of the protection mechanisms is the responsibility of the system 
architect, who is ultimately responsible for allocating portions of the policy to the 
various devices.    The security architect is responsible for translation of the security 
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policy at the policy definition point interface to the system.    Until the policy 
definition point can be simplified, the users of computer systems will depend upon 
the security decisions of the system architects to provide the protections required for 
system security and integrity. 
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Preliminary Glossary of Information Security Terminology  
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The following terms were proposed in (Raskin, Hempelmann, Triezenberg, and 
Nirenburg, 2001) as a preliminary attempt to reconcile the terminology of the security 
community with the ontologies under development at that time.   To the author’s 
knowledge, the list has not been updated or published since the original paper. 
Absolute rate AS-400 Boot sector virus 
Access control Associativity Bootstrap virus 
Access control list Assurance Bounds register 
Access control matrix Assymetric encryption Break 
Access log Attack Brute force attack 
Access triple Attribute Buffer 
Accountability Audit Buffer overflow 
Accuracy Audit log Caesar cipher 
Address Audit operations Call bracket 
Adjudicable Audit options Capability 
Aggregate query Authenticate Career criminal 
Aggressive scheduler Authentication Category 
Algorithm Authenticity CERT 
Amateur Automatic retaliation Certificate 
Analog Availability Certificate distribution 
center 
Analyzability Backdoor Certificate revocation list 
Anklebiter Backup Certification authority 
Anonymity Base register Certified code 
Applet Bastion host Certified mail 
Arbiter Block cipher CGI script 
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Change log Confidentiality Cryptography 
Channel Configuration management Cryptology 
Checksum Confusion Cryptosystem 
Chinese wall policy Connectivity Cycle 
Chinese Wall Model Conservative scheduler Data 
Cipher Constrained data item Data encryption standaard 
Cipher block chain Contract signing Database 
Ciphertext Control Database management system 
Classification Controlled sharing Datagram 
Clearance Cookie Decideability 
Client Copy Decipher 
Clique problem Copyright Decode 
Code CORBA Decrypt 
Collision Core Degausser 
Columnar transposition Core dump Dependability 
Commit Correct Diagram 
Commitment Coupling Diffusion 
Common Criteria Cover story Digest 
Commutativity Covert Digital 
Compartment Covert channel Digital signature 
Complexity Covert timing channel Digital signature scheme 
Composite Cracker Directory 
Compression Credentials Disaster 
Computing system Criteria creep Disclosure 
Conceal Cryptanalysis Distributivity 
Concurrency-control Cryptanalyst Divisible by 
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To:  Ronda Henning 
Date:  May 22, 2013 
 
Re: Security Policies that Make Sense for Complex Systems: Comprehensible Formalism for the System 
Consumer    
 
 
IRB Approval Number:  wang05151302 
 
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level.  Based on the information 
provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB review.  You may proceed with your 
study as described to the IRB.  As principal investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements: 
 
1) CONSENT:  If recruitment procedures include consent forms these must be obtained in such a 
manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the process affords subjects the 
opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers from those directly involved in the research, and 
have sufficient time to consider their participation after they have been provided this information.  
The subjects must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed in a 
secure file separate from de-identified participant information.  Record of informed consent must be 
retained for a minimum of three years from the conclusion of the study. 
2) ADVERSE REACTIONS:  The principal investigator is required to notify the IRB chair and me 
(954-262-5369 and 954-262-2020 respectively) of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may 
develop as a result of this study.  Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, 
depression as a result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of 
confidentiality/anonymity of subject.  Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is serious. 
3) AMENDMENTS:  Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of subjects, consent 
forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to implementation.  Please be advised that 
changes in a study may require further review depending on the nature of the change.  Please contact me 
with any questions regarding amendments or changes to your study. 
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human subjects prescribed in Part 
46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46) revised June 18, 1991. 
 
Cc: Protocol File 
 
From:  Ling Wang, Ph.D. 
            Institutional Review Board       
         
3301 College Avenue • Fort Lauderdale, FL  33314-7796 • (954) 262-5369  
Fax: (954) 262-3977 • Email: inga@nsu.nova.edu • Web site: www.nova.edu/cwis/ogc 
 
 
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN 
UNIVERSITY  
Office of Grants and Contracts 
Institutional Review Board  
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Figure K-1a.   Demographic Information, Question 2, Architecture 1. 
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.    25 for Requirements Format, 25 for 
Narrative Format. 
 
 
Figure K-1b.  Demographic Information, Question 2, Architecture 2. 
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Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.    25 for Requirements Format, 25 for 
Narrative Format. 
 
 
Figure K-1c.   Demographic Information, Question 2, Architecture 3 
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.   25 for Requirements Format, 25 for 
Narrative Format. 
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Figure K-2a.  Demographic Information, Question3, Architecture 1 
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.   25 for Requirements Format, 25 for 
Narrative Format. 
 
 
 
Figure K-2b.  Demographic Information, Question3, Architecture 2 
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Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.   25 for Requirements Format, 25 for 
Narrative Format. 
 
 Figure K-2c.  Demographic Information, Question3, Architecture 3 
Total Sample Size = 50 subjects.  25 for Requirements Format, 25 for 
Narrative Format 
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Figure K-4a:   Respondents with Security Certifications, Architecture 1 (Total 
50 Subjects) 
 
Figure K-4b:  Respondents with Security Certifications, Architecture 2 (Total 
50 Subjects) 
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Figure K-4c.  Respondents with Security Certifications, Architecture 3 (Total 
50 Subjects) 
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Figure K-5.  Types of Certifications Held (all architectures). 
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Figure K-6.   Job Function of Respondents (self-categorized)  
150 respondents, 50 each in architecture 1, architecture 2, and architecture 3. 
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Figure K-7.   Principal Industries of Responders.
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